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1. INTRODUCTION AND INDUSTRY HISTORY
In 1971, the joint Department of Transportation, National
Aeronautics and Space Administrations, Civil Aviation Research
and Development Policy Study (CARD) Report, identified the
problems of providing air service to low density, short haul
markets, as the third most pressing difficulty facing the
United States' aviation industry. In the words of the report,
"Low-Density Short Haul: While lower in
priority than noise and congestion,
solutions to the problems of low-density,
short-haul service will be important to
the future of civil aviation and to its
ability to contribute to the goals of the
Nation. This service of civil aviation
can be a positive force in future regional
development. In order to obtain a better
definition of the problems and potential
of low-density, short-haul service, a
program should be established to deter-
mine accurately market sensitivities to
changes in service, fare, frequency, and
equipment. A government-sponsored market
demonstration is required for this purpose.
Concurrent and integrated with this demon-
stration, the Government should fund
studies for the conceptual design and
analysis of economical vehicles for the
low-density, short-haul market."
(Emphasis Added, p. 2-6)
In response to this policy statement, NASA has undertaken
a number of technical and systems studies as outlined by
Mr. George Cherry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Aeronautics
and Space Technology (Programs) in his 1972 testimony before the
U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Aeronautics and
2Space Technology of the Committee on Science and Astronautics.
" In FY 73, NASA programs relating
specifically to low-density, short-haul
will fall into three main categories:
a. Continuing an effort begun in
FY 72 which is identifying technology
problems associated with providing
economical air service to sparsely-
settled regions.
b. Continuing an effort begun in
FY 72 which will investigate and develop
very-low-frequency navigation techniques
for en route and terminal area navigation
for civil aviation, especially low-density,
short-haul service.
c. Increasing knowledge of economic
and operational factors which bear upon
technology and aircraft requirements.
Studies will be undertaken to fit existing
and hypothetical aircraft into realistic
low-density, short-haul arenas and to
identify where and why economic short-comings
appear. Those that can be improved by
technology will be identified. In addition,
programs will be undertaken to investigate:
ride-quality improvement as it influences
aircraft design and passenger acceptance,
crosswind landing characteristics, and
operational techniques."
This study attempts to answer some of the questions in Item C.
31.1, A HISTORY OF LOCAL AIR SERVICE REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
Small Community Air Service
Since 1961 the number of places in the United States
receiving certificated airline service has decreased by 250
from 729 to 479 points.1 Despite the fact that in 1972
commuter carriers exclusively served an additional 174
airports, it is difficult not to conclude that the scope of
air transportation has deteriorated.2 Although exact numbers
do not exist, the report of the Aviation Advisory Commission
estimated that from 300-500 communities were more than one
hour's drive from a certificated scheduled air service
airport and therefore possible candidates for subsidized
air service. 3 What the cost would be if all these communities
were to receive regular air transportation has not been
calculated, but a similar proposal in 1943 to provide direct
air service to all urban communities was estimated to involve
a cost to the government of between $109-150 million annually.4
Allowing for increases due to inflation over the past thirty
years, that cost might well represent a reasonable estimate
for the present, considering that the federal subsidy to
air carriers in 1972 was over $67 million. 5
CAB Annual Reports 1962 Annex 4, 1971 Table 1, and
The Long Range Needs of Aviation p. VI-146.
2 The Long Range Needs of Aviation p. VI-146.
Ibid. p. VI-146.
6 CAB 1 p. 49.
"Subsidy for United States Certificated Carriers" August 1972,
Appendix VII.
4
Federal involvement with local air service began with,
the Investigation of Local, Feeder, and Pick-up Air Service
initiated in March 1943, and since then the Civil Aeronautics
Board has tried a number of policies in the attempt to provide
these services on a sound economic basis.6 Unfortunately, the
same two problems have consistently proven insurmountable: the
insufficiency of traffic and the lack of a suitable aircraft.
The CAB's difficulties have been compounded by the traditional
abhorence of a continuing government subsidy, on the part of
Congress and the Executive, coexistent with an equally strong
desire to provide air service to small communities. It is
interesting to note that the CAB policies and many of the
recurring suggestions for solution of the local air service
problem were all considered in the original 1943 investigation.
During that investigation, the already certificated
carriers proposed that small community air service should be
accomplished on a "self-sufficient" basis by authorizing
additions to existing routes. Service to the new points
would be cross-subsidized by the carriers' profitable long-
haul markets. The existing airlines proposed at that time to
make considerable use of "skip-stop" schedules providing
service at the small communities in accordance with traffic
volume.- They claimed that their use of comfortable modern
aircraft and the possible provision of single plane through
Docket No. 857 6 CAB 1.
5service would stimulate demand at many small points. These
same arguments were later advanced by the local service
carriers and with its route-strengthening program starting in
the mid-sixties, the CAB adopted that very policy
in awarding them profitable long-haul routes.
The examiners also suggested in 1943 that if special
feeder carriers were to be established and the growth of
the trunks consequently limited, then a balancing limitation
should be imposed on the feeder carriers. It was recommended
that they be strictly limited to feeder services only and
that "(a)n inclination to grow in the other direction, that
is, to nonstop smaller cities and reach out for big city
traffic to the detriment of other carriers should be
8discouraged at the outset." Despite initial CAB discourage-
ment, this "inclination" soon became the major goal of local
service carriers in their desire to attain small or "junior"
trunk status , a goal that has effectively been reached by
Allegheny, following its recent acquisition of Mohawk, as
is apparent in its request for major trunk routes, even at
the expense of foregoing subsidy.
The operating authorizations of feeder routes have
historically reflected the two theories concerning traffic
flows that existed in 1943. An analysis of rail and air
traffic showed that "the preponderant movement of the traffic
Ibid. pp. 29-30.
Ibid. p. 55.
6of small communities is to and from large cities, rather
than between numbers of small cities." On the other hand
bus data indicated that on relatively long routes connecting
two major market centers a substantial amount of the traffic
was of an "on-and-off" nature travelling between inter-
10
mediate points. The conclusion of the examiners was
that a reasonable feeder service would be one which catered
to both types of traffic, travelling between two substantially
large terminal cities, with a number of intermediate points;
that, however, the feeder carrier should have some degree
of lee-way in arranging skip-stop schedules,although
nonstop service should be prohibited between two points
designated on the certificate of an existing carrier.11 The
CAB has gradually liberalized initially restrictive authoriza-
tions requiring feeder schedules to stop at every designated
point, but, even with subsequent segment realignments, this
policy remains evident in most local-service routes.
The question of a suitable local-service aircraft was
also dealt with in the 1943 investigation which found that a
specially designed airplane was necessary. The requirements
envisioned at that time were for a 12 passenger (3,000 lb.
payload) multi-engined aircraft with a 150-180 mph cruising
Ibid. p. 14.
10Ibid. p. 18.
11 p. 55.
Ibid. p. 55.
7speed and an operating cost of about 40¢ per aircraft
revenue mile.12 Requirements remarkably similar to those
of the Association of Local Transport Airlines' (ALTA) Small
Plane-Design Committee issued twenty years later in 1963, which
called for an 18 passenger airplane, a cruise speed of greater
than 300 mph, pressurization (which did not exist commercially
in 1943 on any aircraft), and operating costs of 40¢ per
aircraft mile - although the CAB felt that 60¢ was a more
13
reasonable goal. Aircraft of this type finally became
available in the late sixties with certification of turbine
powered Twin Otters and Beech-99's, which have subsequently
played an important role in the recent rapid development
of the commuter carriers, who operated 171 of them in 1971.14
Otherwise, few aircraft have been specifically designed to
meet these requirements and local air service has generally
been provided by aircraft unsuited to the purpose.
The CAB discouraged early attempts of the local service
carriers to acquire more advanced aircraft with capacities
deemed too large for the markets they served. In 1953, an
application of Pioneer for increased subsidy due to the
cperation of Martin 202's was rebuffed by the Board and may
well have been one factor leading to that carrier's later
merger with Continental.1 5 However, following permanent
12 Ibid. p. 41.
13 Service to Small Communities: Part II p. 18.
14 Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics - Year Ended
December 31, 1971. Table 15.
15 Service to Small Communities: Part II p. 12
8certification in 1955, the CAB relaxed its position and the
local service carriers began to operate substantial numbers
of more modern aircraft in place of the DC-3's used previously.
As these aircraft were generally far larger than the DC-3's
and without a suitable DC-3 equivalent, the carriers started
to decrease and discontinue service at "marginal" communities.
The rapid acquisition of jet aircraft beginning in the mid-
sixties only accentuated the problem of small-city service
and accelerated the withdrawal. With the loan guarantee
aircraft purchase program of the late fifties and the route
strengthening policy of the sixties designed around the
operations of larger aircraft the CAB seems to have encouraged,
or at least abetted, the corporate goal of the local
service carriers to achieve "junior trunk" status.
Subsidy
In section 406 of the Civil Aeronautics Act the CAB
is directed to fix and determine "fair and reasonable rates
of compensation for the transportation of mail by aircraft."
This must be done in such a manner as to "maintain and
continue the development of air transportation to the extent
and of the character and quality required for the commerce
of the United States, the Postal Service, and the national
defense." From 1938 until October 7, 1953 the Postmaster
General paid the total compensation to meet the "needs" of the
air carriers as calculated by the CAB; since then airmail
9service compensation and subsidy have been formally
separated, with the CAB responsible, through Congressional
appropriation, for payment of the subsidy element.
Prior to January 7, 1961 the CAB determined all subsidy
needs on an individual carrier basis. Due to the rapid
expansion and continuous modification of the local service
carriers' route structures after their permanent certification,
this system proved inappropriate for these carriers, often
leaving them in a position where their subsidy rate was
undetermined. Finding that this impaired the carriers'
ability to operate efficiently and plan for the future,
the Board established a "class subsidy rate" effective
January 1, 1961, based on the average costs of the group
and using standard investment criteria developed by the CAB
from analysis of the carriers' requirements. Since its
initial adoption the class subsidy rate formula has been
modified eight times with the last, Class Rate VI, effective
July 1, 1971. 1 6
Similar to those of its predecessor, the objectives of
Class Rate VI, adopted June16, 1972, are: "to relieve the
industry's still critically depressed financial condition;
to equitably distribute the subsidy payments consistent with
the changing needs of the individual carriers; and to establish
a class rate formula that will identify the subsidy related
16 "Subsidy for United States Certificated Air Carriers"
August 1972 pp. 9-10.
10
to services at and between communities and provide positive
incentives for the local service carriers to maintain
adequate services to the small communities."l 7 A further
objective is to encourage small aircraft service at low
traffic-generating communities. 1 8
In spite of their objectives, the last two class
rates have not been able to prevent the local service
carriers from diminishing service at smaller communities,
nor have they been able to encourage the use of small air-
craft. They have had the definite effect of doubling the
subsidy pay to the carriers from $34.3 million in 1970 to
19$62.8 million in 1972. Cross-subsidization through route
strengthening has also proven inadequate and, although three
local service carriers earned enough in 1971 on their
ineligible routes b provide a degree of cross-subsidization,
the industry is not expected to become subsidy free in the
near future. 2 0
The only other group of carriers currently receiving
subsidy are the Alaskan Airlines, whose requirements have
slowly decreased from a high of $9.7 million in 1963 to
their current level of approximately $4.5 million, less
7Docket No. 23682 p.2.
1 8 Ibid. p. 23.
1 9
"Subsidy for United States Certificated Carriers" August 1972
Appendix VII.
2 0 Ibid. p.5.
21
than 7% of the total federal payment. Due to pressure
from Congress and the Executive, subsidy has.ceased to be
22
payed to the other eligible carrier groups.
Citing changes in the small community transportation
system over the past decade and difficulties in assessing
the effectiveness of the present subsidy program, the CAB
in its 1972 Annual Report to Congress has proposed a new
method for providing air service to small communities.
This would take the form of a contract system between the
CAB and the carriers for services determined by the Board.
The amount of subsidy would be predetermined through the
carriers' bids, with no renegotiation permitted and no
follow-on contracts assured, while the performance of the
carrier during the life of the contract would be ensured
by financial guarantees. As with the original 1943 "experi-
ment" in local air service, the new system would initially
be conducted on a limited 3-year trial basis in various
23
areas of the country.
21
Ibid. Appendix VII.
2 2 Subsidy to the Helicopter carriers was eliminated after 1965,
to the Hawaiian carriers after 1967 (except for 1969 when
Aloha received $0.8 million), and to Northeast Airlines
after 1968.
2 3 CAB Annual Reports.to Congress Fiscal 1972 pp.10-11, 84.
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Development of the Carriers
Local Service
When the CAB began to resume its normal functions
towards the end of World War II, the number of applications
for "local" and "feeder" air transportation were so numerous
that a general investigation into these services was
instigated on March 22, 1943 to determine "...the propriety
of extending air transportation to communities and locali-
ties throughout continental United States to which such
transportation may not appear warranted under usual economic
considerations or existing standards of operation, and the
coordination of such transportation with air transportation
presently authorized under usual considerations and existing
standards."24
The Investigation of Local, Feeder, and Pick-up Air
Service was not particularly optimistic in its determination
of "...the extent to which small cities need and would use
air service..."25 However, the CAB felt that its obligations
to promote and encourage civil aeronautics under the 1938
Act, together with the enthusiasm of the applicants and the
general lack of experience with this type of air service,
warranted a trial experiment on a subsidized basis. It was
noted that these short-haul, low-density air services would
2 4Annual Report of the CAB 1943 p.1 1 .
256 CAB 1 p.l.
13
face severe competition frnm surface modes of transportation,
and as a safeguard against static or increasing dependence
on the Government, temporary three-year certificates would
be authorized, confined "...to operations which show a
justifiable expectation of success at a reasonable cost to
26
the Government."
Following its decision of July 11, 1944, the CAB held
a series of consolidated area proceedings and by 1949 twenty
27
new local service carriers had been certificated. In the
first of these cases, Service in the Rocky Mountain States
Area, decided on March 28, 1946 the CAB stated its "guiding
principals" in awarding local air service authority.
2 8 These
included: prospects for success; benefit to the community;
distance to the normal metropolitan trading center; time
of travel by surface modes compared to air, including travel
time to and from the airports used; the comparative fre-
quencies of surface and air schedules; geographic conditions,
especially mountainous terrain; and the financial cost to
the Government. In awarding authority for these expanded
air services to new carriers over existing airlines, the
CAB expected that local operators with small aircraft would
use greater effort and ingenuity in meeting the needs of
small communities.
2 6 Ibid. p.3.
2 70ne carrier, Essair (later to become Pioneer Airlines), had
been previously awarded authority on November 5, 1943,
although service was not begun until April 19, 1945.
286 CAB 695 p.731.
14
By the mid-fifties the local service carriers,
coming up for their second and third renewals under tem-
porary status, were seeking more permanent existence.
In hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce they argued that permanent certification
was necessary because of the difficulties and increased
costs of operation on a temporary basis.29 They stated
that renewal proceedings consumed time and money which could
be better spent improving the operations of the carriers,
while their uncertain future discouraged aircraft manu-
facturers from designing an aircraft tailored to the require-
ments of the local-service airlines and precluded the eco-
nomic advantage of long term arrangements for hangars,
navigational equipment, and maintenance facilities.
The CAB opposed such a move asserting that local air
service had not yet reached maturity and that permanent
certification would make improvement in the route systems of
the several carriers much more difficult. 30 It was felt that
with permanent certification the carriers' incentive to
increase revenues and hold down costs would be lessened and
the Government would be saddled with an annual subsidy bill
of "over $20 million" for the indefinite future. Reference
was made to the fact that many of the costs of operation
2 9Hearings on "Permanent Certificates for Local Service Air
Carriers" pp.30-31.
30
Ibid. p.135.
15
were held down precisely because of temporary status. With
permanent certification, the costs of labour and airport
services were predicted to increase substantially. At
47 percent, the CAB claimed that the average proportion of
subsidy to total revenues was too high, and in addition
presented evidence that the costs of recertification were
not excessive, that it was the accompanying requests for
expanded authority which were expensive. Finally, the
CAB argued that it was the market, not the carriers which
determined the development of new aircraft and that the
Board would favor legislation to aid local-service airlines
in the financing of new equipment.
In spite of the CAB objections, Public Law 38 was
passed on April 19, 1955 amending the Civil Aeronautics Act
to allow permanent certification of the local service
airlines under "grandfather" provisions. The CAB then moved
to expedite such certification to the 13 air carriers then
in existence: Allegheny, Bonanza, Central, Frontier, Lake
Central, Mohawk, North Central, Ozark, Piedmont, Southern,
31
Southwest, Trans Texas, and West Coast. The law required
that all terminal points and at least one half the inter-
mediate points should receive permanent authority ; the rest
at the discretion of the Board, which subsequently determined
31 There had been 14 at the time of the hearings but Pioneer
had merged with Continental on April 1, 1955.
16
that an average of five or more enplaned passengers per
day was necessary to receive certification. 32
The CAB then embarked on a series of twelve area cases
"...to determine the over-all needs for local-service air
transportation and the extent to which the local air carriers
33
could fulfill these needs." In the Seven States Area
Investigation, decided on December 8, 1958, the "use it or
lose it" policy was introduced whereby a community could
receive air service if for the year following the initial
six months it met the minimum standard of an average of
five enplaned passengers daily; although continued service
was not assured to cities enplaning the bare minimum. At
the same time more liberalized operating authority called
"skip-stop" was granted to the local service carriers. As
long as two daily roundtrips were scheduled to intermediate
points, the carriers could provide nonstop service between
non-competitive terminal points or one stop between competi-
tive terminal points. The feasibility was also reviewed of
deleting the authority of trunkline carriers in certain
markets where local service could provide "...equal, additional,
or improved..." air transportation to the communities involved. 34
32
CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics 1971 p.485.
33CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics 1971 p.487.
34
Ibid. p.487.
17
The result of these cases was that by the end of 1963
the unduplicated route miles of the local service carriers
had increased by 37% and their annual subsidy requirement had
more than doubled over its. 1958 value, reaching $67.7 million,
or about $7.64 per scheduled passenger enplaned.35 In his
April 1962 message to Congress on transportation, President
Kennedy called for reductions in the subsidy payments to
the local carriers and requested a specific step-by-step
program from the CAB by mid-1963. In response to the Presi-
dent the CAB stated that most subsidy saving would come from
increased local-service airline revenues as a result of a
period of stabilization after recent rapid route growth and
equipment modernization, but that savings would also come
from a gradually reduced subsidy standard on high density
routes, a nsolidation of airports, and a continuation of
the "use it or lose it" program.
The subsidy requirement began to come down and by 1966
the policy had been further broadened by awarding certain
high-density, short and medium haul markets to the local
service carriers on a subsidy ineligible basis, "...even in
instances where such an award may involve competition with
trunkline service." 3 6 Other routes, marginally profitable
for the trunks, were transferred to the locals, while numbers
3 5CAB Reports to Congress Fiscal 1968 p.11 3 , CAB Handbook of
Airline Statistics 1971 p.54, and "Subsidy for United States
Certificated Air Carriers" August 1972 Appendix VII.
36
CAB Reports to Congress Fiscal 1966 p.4 .
18
of existing segments were consolidated in a variety of
realignment investigations. In this manner the operating
authority of the local service carriers was extended into
regions outside of their historic markets, connecting them
with an increased number of large traffic-generating hubs.
Finally, in 1967 the CAB began the practice of author-
izing local service carriers to fulfill their certificate
obligations through substituted service by commuter airlines.
However, the local service carrier continues to bear the
responsibility of ensuring adequate service in these
substituted markets as required in its certificate and must
be prepared to reinstitute service if the commuter should
fail. By October 13, 1970 the CAB had authorized local
service carriers to suspend service at 39 points where
replaced by commuter carriers providing an adequate level
37
of service. On January 15, 1968 Subpart M of Part 302
was adopted to expedite procedures in the modification or
removal of certain stop restrictions in the local service
carriers certificates. In that year also a series of mergers
reduced the number of locals to nine and the merger of
Mohawk with Allegheny in 1971 brought them to their present
level of eight carriers: Allegheny (Mohawk, Lake Central),
37 Service to Small Communities: Part II p.29 - for further
information see section on commuters.
19
Frntier (Central), Hughes Air West 38 (West Coast, Bonanza),
North Central, Ozark, Piedmont, Southern, and Texas Inter-
national. 3 9
Hawaiian
Regular air passenger service between the Hawaiian
islands was begun on November 11, 1929 by Inter-island, a
carrier owned substantially by a shipping company. Following
the depression,traffic began to pick up and in 1938 Inter-
island was the only Hawaiian carrier to receive a certificate
of public convenience and necessity under the °"grandfather"
provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act. For a while it
continued to be the only air carrier offering legal scheduled
services within Hawaii and during the war provided the only
means of transportation between the islands. By this time
the name Hawaiian Airlines had been adopted and after 1943
the carrier operated free of subsidy. By 1948 air transporta-
tion had again become the only common carrier passenger
service between the islands. 4 0
In the Hawaiian Intraterritorial Service investigation
the CAB found that "(i)n view of the unique dependence of
Hawaii upon air transportation, its importance to the
38 Formerly Air West, Pacific Air Lines, and Southwest Airways.
39 Formerly Trans-Texas Airways.
4 0World Airline Record 1972 p.4 24 .
20
economy and people of the territory, and absent a showing
that a second carrier will seriously impair the ability of
the existing carrier to render adequate and economical
service, public interest requires authorization of additional
air transportation service."4 1 Thus on April 19, 1949
Trans-Pacific Airlines, later called Aloha, was authorized
to carry persons and property over routes nearly duplicating
those of Hawaiian. Although Aloha was originally not
permitted to carry mail and receive subsidy, substantial
losses in the first year of operation caused the carrier to
request and receive airmail and subsidy eligibility fim the
CAB. At the same time the traffic diversion due to
competition was such that Hawaiian also successfully applied
for reinstigation of subsidy assistance. By fiscal 1952 the
total annual subsidy of the two carriers had jumped to
$715 thousand,almost twenty times greater than any amount
received previously.4 2
Even with financial aid from the Government the
carriers were barely profitable when, under pressure from
Congress, the subsidy support to the two airlines was dis-
continued after fiscal 1967. Their position was further
aggravated on September 26, 1967, after the CAB authorized
three domestic trunks to provide direct mainland service to
4110 CAB 62 p.66.
4 2
"Subsidy for United States Certificated Air Carriers"
August 1972 Appendix I.
21
Hilo as well as Honolulu as a result of the Transpacific
Route Investigation. Although the carriers have almost
continuously operated at a loss since then (substantial
in the case of Aloha) they have not received any further
subsidy except for 1969 when Aloha was granted $789
43
thousand.43 In 1970 special permission was given to the
two to engage in mutual capacity reductions. In 1971 a
proposed merger, already recommended by the CAB hearing
examiner, fell through when Hawaiian withdrew because of
unsatisfactory financial prospects for the merged carrier,
but in 1972 the merger was once again under consideration
by the CAB.4 4
Alaskan
The inherent advantages of air service over surface
forms of transportation are nowhere more apparent than in
Alaska with its rugged terrain and long distances between
communities. At the time of the Civil Aeronautics Act in
1938 most of the territory's mail and a substantial amount
of freight were already carried by air. Recognizing that
special conditions existed, the CAB temporarily authorized
the Alaskan air carriers to continue operations wi thout
4 3 Ibid. Appendix VII.
4 4 World Airline Record 1972 p.4 2 6 .
22
regulation pending investigation into the requirements for
air transportation in Alaska.
Begun in 1939, the Alaskan Air Transportation Investigation
was prolonged by the War until December 5, 1942 when the CAB
granted subsidy eligibility and certificates of public
45
convenience and necessity to twenty-one carriers. An
inteqim report had emphasized the importance of air trans-
portation to Alaska, noting that many communities were
virtually inaccessible by any surface mode, and that a four
hour plane trip from Fairbanks to Nome costing $78 had
replaced a thirty day journey by dog team costing $500.46
The report had also foreseen that modifications in the
domestic U.S. air transportation regulations would probably
be required due to the special requirements in Alaska.
This was the case as the certificates issued to
Alaskan carriers authorized both "regular" and "irregular"
routes. The "regular" routes, while similar to those of
the domestic airlines, also permitted the carriers to serve
additional unnamed intermediate points within their area
if they required service. "Irregular" routes designated
areas within which a carrier was free to provide air trans-
portation in any manner suited to the traffic demands,
45Pan Am had previously been awarded some regional authority
along with its mainland-Alaska routes.
46Annual Report of the CAB Fiscal 1941 p.10.
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including a regular-route service. Charter trips and
other special services originating at or destined for
points on regular or irregular routes were also permitted
as long as they were of a casual, occasional, or infrequent
character and did not result in establishing a regular
47
scheduled service.
Even as the certificates were authorized a number of
the Alaskan carriers were about to merge or had ceased
operating. This condition remained for the next decade
or so as the CAB continued to investigate the conditions of
air transportation in Alaska. In accordance with these
conditions a policy was adopted in 1948 of exempting
"pilot-owners" from many of the economic regulations. With
letters of registration, qualified pilots using small air-
craft could perform specialized air transportation services
as long as they were solely within Alaska and not between
points receiving a total of three or more scheduled flights
a week by certificated carriers.4 8
In 1953, the CAB began another comprehensive review
of air transportation in Alaska. As with the previous
investigation, the Intra-Alaska Case dragged on and was
not decided until January 14, 1959. In the meantime seven
4 7Annual Report of the CAB Fiscal 1943 p. 14 .
4 8Annual Report of the CAB Fiscal 1948 p. 35.
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Alaskan carriers had been granted permanent certificates
on December 31, 1956 in accordance with Public Law 741.49
The Intra-Alaska Case authorized a number of route adjust-
ments and deletions of points no longer requiring service.
It established regional local service by intra-Alaskan
airlines certificating two new carriers, authorized main-
land Alaska service by two carriers, and terminated Pan
American's local authority within Alaska.5 0
A further investigation of Alaskan air service was
commenced by the CAB in 1969. Called the Alaska Service
Investigation, only the trunk phase has as yet been completed,
a second bush phase awaiting the Board's decision. As with
previous cases, the investigation involves massive restruc-
turing of air transportation within and to and from Alaska.
In the meantime, mergers have reduced the number of carriers
to five: Kodiak, Reeve Aleutian, Western Alaska, Wien
Consolidated (from the merger of Wien Alaska and Northern
Consolidated), and Alaska Airlines (Cordova, Alaska Coastal,
Ellis). One Alaskan carrier, called Pacific Northern,merged
with the domestic trunk Western Air Lines and presently
pending is yet another merger between Kodiak and Western
Alaska, the two smallest carriers.
4 9Annual Report of the CAB Fiscal 1957 p.5.
50
Annual Report of the CAB Fiscal 1959 p.9.
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Most Alaskan traffic is carried by Alaska and Wien
Consolidated, which also receive 95% of the subsidy.51
Interestingly, Reeve Aleutian has operated since 1957 without
subsidy assistance. Its consistently profitably opera-
tions are attributed to: "(1) the absence of ruinous
competition, (2) relatively high overall load factors,
(3) good cargo business and (4) the especially heavy move-
ment of high revenue mail." 5 2  In 1970 the mail load was
85% of the passenger traffic, measured in ton-miles, while
mail and freight together exceeded the passenger traffic
by 20%. Passenger fares averaged 8¢ per mile and mail
and cargo about 60¢ per ton-mile. 53
Helicopter
Numerous applications for helicopter service were
considered during the 1943 Investigation of Local, Feeder
and Pick-up Air Service, including a comprehensive trans-
portation plan involving mixed helicopter and bus operations
proposed by the Greyhound Corporation. However, the CAB
ruled that it could not be expected to grant applications
for helicopter service until suitable commercial vehicles
could be developed; though the Board did not preclude the
51,,
"Subsidy for United States Certificated Carriers" August 1972
Appendix VIII.
5 2World Airline Record 1972 p.4 54 .
5 3 Ibid. p.454.
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use of helicopters, when they became available, by already
certificated carriers. In fact, as early as July 6, 1939,
for one year Eastern Air Lines had operated a scheduled
airmail service using an autogiro.54
The first regular helicopter service was not initiated
until October 1, 1947 when Los Angeles Airways (LAA) began
to carry mail over three routes in the Los Angeles region.
Subsidy eligibility and the authority for the carriage of
mail and property only was granted by the CAB in a temporary
three-year certificate similar to those being issued to the
local service carriers during the same period. Further
certificated helicopter operations were begun on August 20,
1949 around Chicago by Helicopter Air Service (CHA) (later
called Chicago Helicopter Industries and finally Chicago
Helicopter Airways) and three years later in the New York
area by New York Airways (NYA) which also received passenger
authority. On July 5, 1951 the LAA certificate was renewed
for five years and amended to allow the carriage of passengers
under an area concept, comparable to the Alaskan "irregular"
routes, in which the carrier was exempted from formal
certificate hearings when modifying its route pattern. The
Chicago carrier received similar expanded passenger authority
on June 7, 1956.
54
CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics 1971 p.452.
27
The three carriers flew only mail until 1951 when
they began to carry freight, followed by the inauguration
of the first passenger services by NYA on July 9, 1953.
Prior to the carriage of passengers all of the mail compen-
sation received by the helicopter carriers was designated
as service mail pay and no numerical estimate is available
of the degree tovhich their operations were subsidized,
a lthough experience in the following years indicates that
it must have been considerable. On November 26, 1963 a
fourth and final CAB certificate was granted on a nonsubsidy
basis to San Francisco and Oakland Helicopter Airlines (SFO),
which had been operating since 1961 as an intra-state and
air taxi carrier. At the same time the Board denied all
applications for subsidized helicopter services in the
Washington, D.C. - Baltimore area.
The reason for the CAB's action was that starting with
fiscal 1962, Congress had begun to impose subsidy ceilings
on the operations of the helicopter carriers. Concerned
with the continuing high level of these carriers' require-
ments for financial assistance relative to the service
provided, Congress authorized decreasing amounts of subsidy
in each of the years following, finally cutting off all
subsidy at the end of calendar 1965. Without financial
assistance from the Government, the helicopter carriers
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were only able to continue operations through the support
of the regular scheduled airlines. SFO, which had never
received Government aid was no better off, having operated
at a loss from the first despite substantially higher fares
and an advantageous route pattern. By 1965 SFO's accumulated
deficit had wiped out its stockholders' equity and it also
requested help from the regular airlines.5 5
Earlier, the helicopter carriers had received a form
of indirect subsidy from the other airlines through the
absorption of some of the relatively high helicopter fares
for passengers with interline tickets. After 1965 more
direct aid was also given in the form of loans and free
operating assistance. Despite this help and despite the
substitution of less expensive STOL aircraft operations
on some routes, the helicopter carriers continued to operate
at a substantial loss. Financial difficulties forced more
limited operations which, together with improved airport
ground access, in turn decreased passenger appeal and
reduced revenue traffic, while increasing unit costs.
As a result of these difficulties, LAA ceased to
cperate on October 7, 1970; CHA provides only a minimum of
service and ceased scheduled operations entirely for the
three years 1966-1968 until the regular airlines restarted
5 5World Airline Record 1972 p.455.
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service to Midway airport; SFO is in bankruptcy and
operates under trusteeship; and only NYA, under control
of Pan American and TWA since May 23, 1966, provides
any significant service, which is nevertheless barely one
half of its 1967 level. In 1969 a five-year temporary
certificate was awarded to Washington Airways for helicopter
service in the Washington, D.C. - Baltimore area. Lacking
downtown Washington heliport site, service was never
initiated and the case is once again under CAB consideration.
Air Taxis, Commuters, and Others
After the CAB assumed authority under the Civil
Aeronautics Act for the regulation of air transportation,
one of its first actions was to adopt Regulation 400-1 on
October 18, 1938 exempting from the economic and safety
provisions of the Act all carriers engaged in non-scheduled
operations only. The Investigation of Non-scheduled Air
Services begun in July 1944 concluded on May 17, 1946 that
the distinction between scheduled and nonscheduled carriers
was fundamental and continued the exemption requiring only
that the carriers report certain organizational and opera-
tional data. The knowledge so gained caused the CAB to
create a new class of carriers called "noncertificated
irregular carriers". Those operating aircraft of under
10,000 pounds gross take-off weight (amended to 12,500 lbs.
on October 5, 1949) were classified as "small irregular
carriers" and subjected to a minimum of economic regulations.
30
A letter of registration was required and any regular
service between two points prohibited.
Under Economic Regulations, part 298 enacted February
20, 1952 the CAB recognized that the small irregular
carriers were not competitive with the certificated route
carriers and authorized them to provide regular service
connecting small communities, not served by the scheduled
carriers, with points so served. This authority was
virtually unlimited within the continental United States
and between the U.S. and foreign and overseas points,
prohibited only between points receiving helicopter service.
Operations were restricted within U.S. territories and
possessions and banned entirely in Alaska where it was felt
that the need for supplementary service was amply met by
the various existing classes of Alaskan air carriers.
The regulation also changed the name of the carriers to
"air taxis" to more nearly reflect the nature of the services
performed and to encourage their use by the public.
The authority to carry mail was withheld until
November 4, 1965 when Part 298 was amended to allow mail
service, on an unsubsidized basis, for a three year period.
This initial authority applied only within the continental
United States and Hawaii in markets where no certificated
carrier held active authority. Further amendments that
year eliminated prior restrictions on operations within
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U.S. territories and possessions, removed the prohibition
on regular services between points served daily by a
certificated carrier, and liberalized operating authority
in Hawaii. Certain market and rate restrictions accompanied
the new authority to carry mail in order to safeguard the
interests of the certificated carriers. Air taxis were
prevented from operating in markets in which on-line service
was authorized to a single certificated carrier, while a
final rate had to be established before the carriage of
mail could begin.
Since 1965 Part 298 has been further amended several
times extending and expanding the operating and airmail
authority of the air taxis, including permission to carry
mail in competitive markets. Most notable was the recent
modification of the aircraft size limitation permitting
the use of aircraft with up to thirty passenger seats and a
payload capacity of 7,500 pounds. Prior to this the use of
large aircraft had been authorized by exemption in a
number of special markets and areas.
In 1969 another amendment to Part 298 was issued,
requiring all air taxi operators to register annually and
designating as "commuter air carriers" "those operators which
perform, pursuant to published schedules, at least five
round trips per week between two or more points." Previously
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referred to as third-level carriers, they are required to file
quarterly reports of their operations. Apart from the
restrictions discussed above, the CAB exercises no other
regulatory control over commuter carriers and with freedom
of entry and exit the turnover rate is quite high. A
number of operators fail, but, generally starting out as
regularized air taxis, most commuters revert to their
former status if unable to operate successfully as scheduled
carriers; others may only provide scheduled operations on
a seasonal basis.
On July 17, 1967 Apache, a schedule air taxi, was
authorized to provide substitute service for American
Airlines at Douglas, Arizona.56 Rapidly thereafter suspension
of certificated carrier operations at marginal points in
favour of commuter carriers has become a major CAB policy.
As of October 13, 1970 substitution had been permitted at
fifty-five points, thirty-nine for local service carriers
and twenty-six for trunks. 5 7
In many cases applications for suspension/substitution
have involved a service agreement between the commuter and
the certificated carrier. The nature of the agreements has
varied, but the most comprehensive have been those contracted
5 6 CAB Reports to Congress Fiscal 1968 p.119.
5 7Service to Small Communities: Part II p.29.
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under the "Allegheny Commuter" program.58 Subject to CAB
approval, Allegheny has selected its commuters, awarded
them ten-year contracts, and guaranteed a breakeven financial
result during the first two years through subsidy. Carriers
so chosen go by the name "Allegheny Commuter", painting
their aircraft in Allegheny colours and offering joint fares.
Allegheny provides its computerized reservation service,
interline ticketing and baggage handling, and includes the
complete schedules of the commuters in its own timetable.
In return Allegheny requires that the commuter carry the
same level of liability insurance as it does itself, that
flights are crewed by a uniformed captain and first officer
and operated at a 95% completion factor.
In 1952, 1,442 air taxis held letters of registration
with the CAB compared to 1,900 registered during fiscal 1972;
of those registered in 1972, 185 were commuter air carriers. 59
According to Board policy, statistics are only published
after one year, and in 1971, 160 carriers reported (only
107 reporting all four quarters) having carried 4,925,000
passengers, 27,720 tons of cargo, and 50,616 tons of mail.
An average of 65,710 flights were made each month, serving
60
466 airports.
58Ibid. pp.35-38.
5 9Annual Report of the CAB Fiscal 1952 p.8 and
CAB Reports to Congress Fiscal 1972 p.12.
60Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics - Year Ended
December 31, 1971 p.l.
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Prior to giving air taxis scheduled service authority
in 1952, the CAB had temporarily certificated a number of
commuter services in the forties on a nonmail (nonsubsidy)
basis. Most of the certificates were never renewed due to
failure to initiate scheduled services; however, more
recently a few certificated commuter type operations have
been operated under the CAB classification of "Other"
61
carriers.
On January 11, 1960 Avalon Air Transport was
authorized to carry passengers, property and mail, without
subsidy assistance, between Santa Catalina Island and the
Los Angeles area. This service had previously been
abandoned in 1955 by Catalina Air Transport certificated
under the "grandfather" provisions of the Civil Aeronautics
Act. Avalon itself only operated as an other carrier
until its temporary certificate expired after which time it
continued service as a regular air taxi. In 1966 Aspen
Airways, having operated as an air taxi since 1953, requested
a certificate for its operations between Denver and the ski
resort. A certificate was granted on a nonsubsidy basis
in June 1967 and since then two other carriers have been
61When the term "domestic service" was amended on January 1,
1970 to include operations within the 50 states, the inter-
national and territorial classification of Alaska Airlines
was changed to other.
35
similarly authorized, Tag Airlines in November 1969 and
Wright Air Lines in July 1972. Tag later suspended
operations in August 1970 and a merger between it and
Wright is currently before the CAB.
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2. INDUSTRY AND MARKET STRUCTURE
Grouping airlines as local service or commuter carriers
does not adequately describe either the characteristics of a
particular carrier, the markets served, the route patterns used
or the services provided. For example, Table 2.1 lists some
statistics for the continental local service carriers. Using
this data, they can be divided into at least three subgroups.
First, Allegheny stands by itself as by far the largest and
most trunk-like local service airline. In fact, it boards more
passengers than several trunks. The second group is composed
of Frontier, Hughes Airwest and North Central. Each of these
is characterized by extensive route mileage (6,500 to 8,500)
and a high number of stations (70 or more). The third group
are the four smaller carriers; Ozark, Piedmont, Southern and
Texas International. Each has a route network of less than
6,000 miles and serves 50 to 55 stations. These smaller carriers
also tend to be concentrated in one geographic region even
though they do have some long haul routes. This makes their
choice of equipment easier since most points in their systems
have similar weather and geographic features. In contrast, a
larger carrier like Frontier must operate in Montana winters,
Texas summers, Arizona deserts,and Colorado mountains.
The commuter industry is also quite diversified. Some of
TABLE 2.1
Local Service Statistics - 1972(a)
Eughes* North Texas
Aileqheny Frontier Airwest Central Ozark . Piedmont 1{Southern Intern.iona!
of Stations 74 91 74 70 53 50 55 z5
e-,:nue Paszenjers (000) 10,096 2, 616 2,558 4,319 2,984 3,179 2,1C1 2,161
sveu 2pssenger Miles (000) 2,961,662 1,099,503 891,890 1,029,193 819,703 885,633 596,197 ! C85,-53
va:ie A::t Miles (00) 6,076,500 2,118,882 1,875,093 2,048,133 1,668,165 1,769,273 1,279,175 .,374;1 7
i.,zxress, Freight) 35,878 12,743 5,985 12,181 10,662 8,765 6,963 93
,a- s Eca4 Factor 48.7 51.9 45.0 50.3 49.1 50.1 46.6 4
her f Aircraft in Service:
Jet 62 12 21 16 19(8 leased) 15 15 15
OcIer 40 35 23 33 21 30 17 2
.f Aizcraft
201 164 185 128 150 138 144
t 1e-"Er C -Er.loyees 7,600 3, 301 3,400 3,123 2,681 3,038 2,009 2,C4
cct ils orat-1970 7,5 59 (c) 8,509 6,494 6,750 4,895 3,623 5,145 5.8
"kesults affected by laior dispute ending mid-April 1972.
a. CSurce - PuJli Bsqnefits Provided by Local Airlines. Prepared by SARC for ALTA (1973).
b. Source - Handbook of Airline Statistics. CAB (1971).
c. Allegheny + Mohawk.
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the carriers are in fact "mini-airlines", operating multi-
aircraft fleets throughout regions several hundred miles
square. At the other size extreme are the "mom and pop"
operators with one or two aircraft serving a single market.
Some commuters provide basic air service to small, isolated
communities. Others offer air service as a convenience to
travellers in dense population areas who want to save time
getting to the airport for connecting flights. Operators in
these dense markets already provide high frequency service and
are now looking for aircraft in the 30 seat range to meet
peak demand (particularly where airport slots may be limited).
Other operators are looking toward the day their markets will
support more than a few flights per day and they may be able to
use 15 to 19 passenger aircraft like the bigger commuters.
Because of the diversity in both the local service and the
commuter carriers, it is better to discuss problems in terms
of route structures, the type of service offered and the types
of markets served rather than characterize the problems by
industry.
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2.1 Route Structures
Ideally, an airline selects the aircraft best suited to
its route structure. If there is no appropriate aircraft
the airline will select the next best option. Once this non-
optimal aircraft is in the fleet, however, the airline will
try to modify its route structure to take advantage of the air-
craft's specific characteristics. Thus route structure and
aircraft type are intimately connected.
Several route structures can be identified. The
classic route patterns of the local service industry are
the hub-to-hub multistop and the multistop feeder patterns
shown in figures 2.1 and 2.2. Although these patterns may seem
similar, aircraft load factors differ greatly. In the hub-to-
hub case, the aircraft leaves the first hub with a fairly high
load. A number of these original passengers get off at the first
stop, some at the next, and so on, until few if any get off at
the destination hub. However, a few passengers for the destina-
tion hub may get on at the first stop. More board at the second
and succeeding stops until the plane arrives at the destination.
Since few passengers travel between the smaller cities by air,
most are traveling to or from the smaller city and the hub at
either end. Thus, although each stop may not produce many
boardings or departures, the overall load-factor for any seg-
ment does not vary as much as might be anticipated.
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In contrast, the multistop feeder flight does not accumu-
late passengers as passengers from the originating hub deplane.
As a result, there may be high load factors for the segments
near the hub but low load factors at the extremities. Fig-
ure 2.3 shows Frontier's flight 526. Between the major cities,
it typifies hub-to-hub multistop operations. As it leaves
Denver and wends its way into Montana, it becomes more typical
of a multistop feeder flight.
Both of these two service patterns present an aircraft
sizing problem. The plane must be able to accomodate the
traffic on the peak segment. As a result, the aircraft is
too large to economically serve less dense markets. It has
been argued that the CAB's early policy of requiring local
service carriers to provide multistop service, created this
"segment flow" problem and is the primary reason that an
economical, smaller aircraft has not been developed as a "DC3
(I)
replacement" Whether this is true or not, the multistop
route structure has determined the aircraft size.
With the acquisition of jet aircraft capable of serving
longer haul markets, several of the local service carriers have
developed route patterns defined as regional-bypass-to-distant-
hub, (or bypass routes) as shown in Figure 2.4. Rather than
feed traffic into the local hub and there lose it (or at best
1. Eads, George. The Search for an Efficient Short-Haul Aircraft:
A Case Study in Conflicting Government Incentives. Distributed
at M.I.T. Workshop on Low/Medium Density Air Transportation (1973).
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be forced to compete with a trunk carrier for the long haul
flight to the distant hub), the local carrier makes one or
two stops at smaller cities to accumulate passengers, and
then flies directly to the destination, bypassing the regional
hub. After acquiring DC9s, Southern revamped its entire ser-
vice pattern to use this bypass concept where possible.
This is an example of the aircraft shaping the route structure.
A final route structure, most often seen in commuter
operations, is the hub-and-spoke pattern shown in figure 2.5.
The carrier provides nonstop or at most one stop service from
outlying areas directly to the hub. Since they do not face a
segment flow problem, the commuters can size their aircraft
for the specific run. Peak capacity is provided through
scheduling additional sections.
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2.2 Types of Service
There are two basic types of air service. The first is
origin-destination service where the traveller both starts
and completes his trip on one flight. The second is connecting
service. The passenger is transferred from his community to the
regional hub where he connects with a long haul flight (usually
of a trunk airline) to his destination.
Many commuter airlines have been created specifically to
serve this connecting traffic market, particularly in high
density areas surrounding major hubs. In these areas, the carrier
is competing with the automobile, the principal mode of airport
access. To compete effectively, total trip time and cost must
be competitive with the car. Therefore, the carriers have
tailored their service to meet the connecting passenger's needs.
Flights are timed to match the long haul departure and arrival
patterns at the hub airport. Service is frequent throughout
the day in order to reduce waiting time at the hub.
To compete on a cost basis, the commuter may offer free or
reduced rate parking at the local airport. Joint and through
fare agreements with the certificated carrier are also used to
lower traveller costs. The passenger pays a small portion,if
any, of the normal commuter fare. The remainder is reimbursed
to the commuter by the certificated carrier from the long haul
revenues. By offering the package, the certificated carrier can
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capture more of the long haul traffic than another certificated
carrier who does not participate in a joint or through fare
arrangement. The commuter carries more traffic and the traveller
receives better service for about the same cost.
Commuter carriers serving the low or medium density markets
face a different problem. A higher percentage of their traffic
is origin-destination; people from the small community going into
the hub for personal or business reasons. This dictates a
different service pattern. The origin-destination passenger
would like to leave the outlying community in the morning and
return in the evening. There is high demand during these periods,
but much less during the rest of the day. As a result, aircraft
utilization is low unless the carrier can develop off-hour
markets. Cargo and mail contracts provide. offsetting loads in
many cases. In other markets, the carrier may try to provide
connecting service in a shorter haul market using his idle air-
craft to provide frequency. In any case, the resulting service
pattern will not be the same as for high density feeder operations.
Since a commuter carrier usually specializes in either high
density hub and spoke feeder operations or low density service,
he can tailor his service patterns, routes and aircraft for one
market or the other. In contrast, the local service carrier must
serve both types of markets simultaneously. Figure 2.6 indicates
the mix of connecting and origin-destination traffic for markets
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into Denver served by Frontier. Using CAB data, the percentage of
passengers connecting at Denver was plotted against distance for
all small cities served by Frontier within approximately 400
miles of Denver. As might be expected, cities closer in pro-
vided a higher percentage of connecting passengers, while more
people further out made Denver their destination. This is pro-
bably because people closer to the hub are more likely to drive
into town for personal or business reason than people several
hundred miles away. Also, as might be expected, there is a lower
percentage of connecting passengers on flights into Denver from
communities that have air service to other connection points.
The connecting passengers from the small town are thus spread
among several hubs leaving a higher percentage of passengers
with Denver as their ultimate destination.
Because of the segment flow problem discussed earlier, the
local carriers use fairly large aircraft, at least compared to
commuters. Since these aircraft cost more per mile to operate
than a commuter aircraft, a local is not able to provide as high
a frequency in a connecting market as a commuter carrier using
smaller planes. Likewise, a local must generate more passengers
than a commuter to break even at low density points.
Through the use of through and joint fares, the local can
offer some of the same economic incentives as the commuters for
connecting passenger. Likewise, the benefits of reduced parking
51
rates can also induce connecting passengers to use the local
carrier instead of driving. Unlike the commuter, however,
the local carrier cannot tailor his service to connecting or
origin-destination traffic since he must serve both types of
markets at the same time. He must strike some compromise.
To maximize their revenues under this complex situation,
many locals have developed an effective strategy. Profitable
markets receive excellent service. Aircraft are used at prime
hours and with sufficient frequency to maximize passenger satis-
faction, thus maximizing passenger revenues. The low density
markets that don't support themselves receive the minimum ser-
vice needed to entitle the carrier to subsidy. Since the CAB
does not specify when subsidized service is to be rendered, the
carrier fits its schedule.around available aircraft, often at
off peak hours, to serve the low density points. This minimizes
the cost of serving these markets, maximizing the revenues de-
rived from subsidy.
The resulting multistop or off-hour flights do not satisfy
the needs of these markets. There is not enough frequency to
satisfy the connecting passenger, and the times of arrival and
departure are not tailored to one day round trips to the nearest
air hub. However, it is probably the best service available
under the regulatory circumstances. Many of the local service
carriers have a real interest in serving the markets they were
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created to serve. But if they were to change their service
patterns, they would lose more revenue from their better markets
than they would gain from subsidized points. The resulting
overall loss would increase overall system subsidy requirements
and eventually lead to general decay of service to all points.
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2.3 Market Structure
Markets can be defined in terms of the number of passen-
gers generated, the length of haul and the degree of isolation
from other cities or transportation hubs. The first and second
elements of this definition indicate the economic condition
of the market. The first and third elements reflect the public
benefit provided by the service.
In addressing the problem of market definition in the past,
rather mechanical approaches have been taken. For example, the
Civil Aeronautics Board, under its "use it or lose" policy,
would allow a petition by a carrier to delete communities
boarding 5 or less people per day from the carrier's certificate,
(2)
unless unusual circustances could be shown. In the 1971
Bureau of Operating Rights' study on service to small communities (3 )
a test based on both the number of boardings and the degree of
isolation was proposed. The degree of isolation was measured on
a sliding scale that factored in both the length of drive to the
nearest air hub and the service level at the hub.
This type of mechanical test offers computational ease,but
raises the issue of where the limits should be set. Since the
decision must, by its nature, be somewhat arbitrary, the limits
will be too severe in some markets and too lax in others. However,
the mechanical test is useful in establishing a baseline or starting
2. Seven State Area Investigation. 28 C.A.B. 680 (1958)
3. Bureau of Operating Rights. Service to Small Communities. Civil
Aeronautics Board (March, 1972).
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point for regulatory policy and procedures.
In a study of aircraft requirements, a different definition
is needed. Since the aircraft will be selected on the basis of
economic performance, an economic market definition has been
selected.
For a given fare and cost structure, the economics of a given
market are determined by the number of passengers boarded and the
length of haul. With this in mind, a low density market is defined
as one in which a carrier's revenues, excluding subsidies, do not
meet its expenses, while a medium density market is defined as one
in which the carrier can at least break even. A carrier can con-
vert a low density market into a medium density market by either
raising the revenues generated or by lowering expenses. Converse-
ly, a medium density market can erode into a low density market
if revenues fall or expenses increase.
To decide whether revenues cover expenses, one must consider
the impact of the particular market segment on the total system,
and not examine it on its own merits alone. Often the people
boarded at a small community will connect to a more profitable
long haul flight on the same airline. Thus a carrier that cap-
tures a high percentage of its small town traffic for longer
haul flights will continue to serve a low density point even with-
out external subsidy.
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Revenues can be increased by either raising fares or by
increasing passengers. Depending on the fare elasticity in the
market, a fare increase might actually decrease overall revenue,
and so must be considered with caution. To generate more pass-
engers,improved service and/or advertising may be required.
But this could increase expenses which might offset any revenue
gains, particularly if only a few additional passengers are
boarded.
Expenses can be lowered in many ways. The most common has
been to reduce the level of service. In general, this has
resulted in fewer passengers as people substitute their automo-
biles for infrequent or inconvenient flights.
Since most local service and commuter carriers have limited
capital, the response in low density markets has been to minimize
expenses rather than maximizing revenues. They are rarely will-
ing to gamble on revenue increases resulting from fare cuts or
service increases. The result has been a decline or actual
deletion of service to points that might have the potential of
supporting air travel if service were improved.
What is a low density point to one carrier could be a
medium density market for another. Commuters, with their lower
cost.structure, can serve points profitably that would require
a subsidy for a local service carrier. However, there are some
markets that cannot support regularly scheduled air service by
56
any type of carrier. These can be defined as very low density
markets and would be most economically served by on-demand
air taxi operators, if at all.
The degree of isolation is not an economic factor, but a
political issue. It has little bearing on the type of aircraft
used to provide service, but rather relates to whether there should
be service at all. This public service aspect of air transporta-
tion was recognized by the CAB during the early 1940's and was
a major factor in starting the Local Service Experiment.(4)
As with low and medium density, the degree of isolation
escapes precise definition. As mentioned, the CAB Bureau of
Operating Rights' report on service to small communities recommend-
ed a test based on the driving time to the nearest air hub and
the level of service at that hub. No community within 90 driving
minutes of any hub was considered isolated. If the hub were a
major one, no community within a two hour drive was considered
isolated.
Since aircraft requirements do not depend on the degree of
isolation, a less precise definition has been adopted for this
study. A market is not considered isolated as long as the auto-
mobile is an effective competing mode. A market is isolated when
the bulk of the intercity traffic goes either by air, or not at
all.
4. Investigation of Local, Feeder, and Pick-Up Service. 6 CAB 1 (1944).
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Figure 2.7 is an example of a low density, isolated market.
An actual portion of the Frontier route structure is shown.
The numbers in parenthesis represent the average number of pass-
engers boarded per day and the driving time to the nearest air
hub in minutes for each city served. Most of these are
actually very low density markets. There are few highways
much less interstate freeways connecting the towns.
In contrast, the Southern Airways system reproduced in Fig-
ure 2.8 provides service to low density but non-isolated points.
Interstate highways parallel many of the routes so the automobile
is a very convenient alternative to air service.
Another type of market was specifically identified with
typical commuter operations. This is the high density feeder
market primarily providing airport access from communities
surrounding major air hubs. Operators in these markets face
different problems than those in low or medium density areas.
They provide high frequency, very short haul service with result-
ant high wear from frequent takeoffs and landings. Economically,
the major problems are a high degree of peaking and directionality
in their traffic flow and automobile competition. Faced with
many empty backhauls, it is difficult to get the system load
factor over 50%. Figure 2.9, typical of a high density feeder
market, shows Golden Wests' route system in the Los Angeles area.
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A final type of market is created by geographic consider-
ations, taking special advantage of the aircrafts' ability to
fly over water or mountainous terrain. Automobile travel, if
available at all, is circuitous and time consuming. Figure 2.10
shows Wright Airline's service across Lake Erie and the highway
alternatives. Other examples are Aspen and Rocky Mountain
Airlines' service to mountain ski resorts and the many carriers
serving the islands of the West Indies.
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3. AIRCRAFT ANALYSIS
This section of the report addresses the basic issues
related to aircraft in the low/medium density area. The
first part is concerned with aircraft pricing; the second provides
a comparison of aircraft suitable for this area; the third
discusses briefly the possible world wide market for new aircraft
configured for 20 to 60 passengers.
3.1 The Price of Transport Aircraft
The price of a new airplane is clearly one of the critical
factors in determining the aircraft type in the low/medium density
area served by local service airlines and commuter air carriers.
This section presents an approximate method to rapidly calculate
the cost, and consequently the price, of new subsonic transport
aircraft. (In this discussion all dollars are 1972 dollars.)
The price which is set by a manufacturer for a new aircraft
is a function of the prices of similar aircraft on the market, the
share of the overall market he expects to obtain, and his costs of
manufacturing the vehicle. In defining a price, he establishes a
br.,akeven production run size; ie. he expects to sell at least this
number of aircraft over a predetermined period of time. Figure 3.1
shows the price of current transport aircraft plotted against
operating weight empty. At the lower end of aircraft(those of
less than 50,0001bs) and of primary interest for the low/medium
density markets there is considerable scatter. In this spectrum
there are small and larger turboprops (DHC-6 and HS748) and
government-built airplanes (YAK-40), as well as conventional
FIGURE 3.1
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jet aircraft.
Manufacturing costs of new aircraft can be divided into
"development" costs and 'production" costs. Development costs
are the non-recurring costs of designing, testing, and certific-
ating a new transport aircraft. Production costs are those
incurred in establishing and running a production line for
building essentially similar aircraft.
Airplane development costs vary with the complexity of
the aircraft. However, a rough estimate can be based upon
historical development costs and a relationship to empty weight
less engings of the vehicle. For subsonic aircraft, development
costs are approximately $3,000/lb. Thus, for the B727-200, the
development costs are assumed to be $300 million, the B747 $1,200
million, and for a hypothetical new 40 passenger subsonic aircraft
(empty weight of 20,000 lbs.), the US-40, the development costs
should be approximately $60 million. Since inflation is a fact
of life, development costs also change over time. Depending on when
development of a new 40 passenger plane takes place, a higher
price per lb. may be indicated.
Breaking the development costs down as a cost per
airplane, it becomes immediately obvious that the development
cost per unit depends very strongly on the size of the production
run, n. For the US-40, the unit development cost for a production
run of 50 would be $1.2 million; for 500 $0.12 million. Figure
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3.2 shows this strong dependence. Thus a run size of at least
200 would be required to reduce the development cost aspect of
the overall cost figure. The potential size of the market
for the aircraft thereby becomes an important variable in
predicting total airplane costs and consequently complete airplane
price.
The recurring production costs also vary with the number
of aircraft produced, although the reduction due to quantity is
not as pronounced. This reduction occurs because of a well-estab-
lished "learning process" which takes place on large scale
production runs. The cost of the nth airplane, C(n),on a
production -line can be expressed as a function of the cost of the
first airplane, C(1), plus a learning variable,p, in the following
form: C(n) = C(l)n-P  (3.1)
A learning variable of p = 0.23 corresponds to a 85% learning
curve, where doubling the run size reduces costs to 85% of their initial
value. This is a reasonable value for such a complex item as an
airplane. An average production cost per airplane is:
C(l)n-P
C =
av 1-p (3.2)
The cost of the initial airplane can also be roughly
estimated at $200/lb. of empty weight (resulting in as initial
productior cost of $4million for the Us-40). Again, depending
at what point in time production would begin, the initial cost
would also be higher due to inflationary factors. Thus the average
production cost of a new subsonic aircraft is estimated as:
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FIGURE 3,2
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200n -.23
av 0.77 (3.3)
The "price" of engines is assumed to be $25/7.b. of
static thrust (To). The engine price is assumed to be independent
of airframe production size. The $25/lb. figure assumes that the
engines used have their own production line and will be used on more
than one vehicle. Thus engine costs are:
C =25 N T (3.4)
e eo
where Ne is the number of engines used on the aircraft.
The total average aircraft cost is thus summarized as
Equation (3.5).
C (3000 200n 0 2 3C= ) W + 25 N T
ac ( n + 0.77 e e o (3.5)
where We is basic operating weight empty less engines of the
aircraft.
For an example, a US-40 design, the following parameters
would apply: W = 20,000 lbs.
T = 8,000 lbs. N = 2
o e
for n = 200
C = $ 2.3 million
ac
To allow for some return on investment, the US - 40 could
be priced at $2.5 million. At this price, it would be competitive
with the Falcon 30.
To show the effect of government funded development, Table 3.1
presents the range of total aircraft costs for different assumed
development costs and different production quantities. It is
apparent that government development (zero assumed development
cost) of this type of aircraft makes a suLstantial impact on cost
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TABLE 3.1].
SUMMARY OF AIRCRAFT COST
( TWIN 40 PAX JET)
NO. OF AIRCRAFT IN PRODUCTION RUN
50 100 200 500
ASSUMED 0 2.58 2.27 2.00 1.70
DEVELOPMENT
COST
($ m) 60 378 2.87 2.30 1.82
100 4.58 3.27 2.50 1.90
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when the production run is assumed to be small. If the market
is foreseen to be 200 aircraft of more, the development costs
are no longer critical. A graphical presentation of the same
information for a 30 passenger twin engine plane is shown in
Figure 3.3.
FIGURE 3.3
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3.2 Aircraft Comparison
The material in this section is intended to provide a
convienent comparison of different aircraft suitable for
service in the low/medium density areas. Both existing and
proposed aircraft are shown. The list of aircraft presented
is not all inclusive; however the range of planes in terms of
passenger configurations is from 20 to 60, and thus the list is
fairly representative of available aircraft.
The three major areas of comparison are performance (Tables
3.2,3.4), range-payload (Figures 3.4,3.7), and economic (Tables
3.3,3.5; Figures 3.5,3.6,3.8,3.9). The economic comparison is
based on the ATA 1967 "Standard Method of Estimating Comparative
Direct Operating Costs of Turbine Powered Transport Airplanes"
assuming 2500 hour annual utilization, a 12 year depreciation
period, and a $4.00 per hour maintenance labor rate. The ATA
formula is designed to provide a basis of comparison between dif-
fering types of airplanes and should not be considered a reliable
assessment of the actual true value of the operating costs exper-
ienced on a given airplane.
Some of the other terms used in this comparison are:
Passenger Capacity - Most of the aircraft are offered in several
seating configurations. The numbers shown in the passenger
capacity figure reflect this fact.
Maximum Takeoff Weight - Includes the aircraft operating empty
weight, the fuel weight, and the payload.
Maximum Cruise Speed - The maximum cruise speed for the aircraft
at an altitude of 15,000 feet. The value is given in
73
statute miles per hour.
Takeoff Distance Required - This value is the approximate runway
length required to satisfy FAR Part 25, at sea level and
ISA +150 C, for the aircraft with maximum payload and fuel
for a 300 mile trip not including reserves.
Range with Maximum Payload - The distance in statute miles that
the aircraft can fly with maximum payload, excluding reserve
fuel.
$/BlockHour - Computed for a stage length of 100 miles.
$/Available Seat Mile - Computed for a stage length of 100 miles.
Cost per Aircraft Trip - Cost per Seat Trip - These values are
given in the form C +C2d where C1 is a constant unrelated
to trip distance (d), and C2 is the mileage rate.
The aircraft prices used in the economic comparison are as
follows (in 1972 dollars):
Convair 580 (used) $ 250,000
DHC - 6 (new) 680,000
Swearingen Metro 705,000
Nord 262 (new) 1,000,000
YAK 40 (new) 1,100,000
F 27 (new) 1,360,000
F 27-500/FH 227 (new) : 1,600,000
HS 748 (new) 1,600,000
DHC - 7 2,300,000
Falcon 30 2,500,000
US - 40 2,500,000
VFW 614 3,000,000
Of the smaller aircraft, the Swearingen Metro appears to be
TABLE 3,2
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
DHC- 6 METRO NORD 262 YAK 40 FALCON 30 VFW614 DHC-7
PASSENGER 18-20 20 26-29 27-40 29-38 40-44 48
CAPACITY
MAXIMUM
TAKEOFF 12,500 12,500 23,370 36,067 32,410 41,000 41,000
WEIGHT
( Ib.)
MAXIMUM
CRUISE 210 300 260 311 495. 415 267
SPEED
(mph)
TAKEOFF
DISTANCE 1,500 2,800 3,600 3,280 4,550 3,950 2,000
REQUIR ED(ft)
RANGE
WITH
MAX IMUM 70 200 1,490 375 325 325 700
PAY LOAD(mi.)
FIGURE 3,4
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TABLE 3.3
ECONOMIC COMPARISON
DHC-6 METRO NORD 262 YAK 40 FALCON 30 VFW 614 DHC-7
$/BLOCK HR. 154. I1 156.7 188. 6 260. 3 362. 3 410.0 313.8
$/AVAILABLES/AVAT MILABLE Q085 0.07 1 0.065 0.058 0.062 0.065 0.059SIrAT MILE
COST PER 104.45+ 95.92+ 130.61+ 155.87+ 173.87+ 203.81+ 181.26+AIRCRAFT TRIP() 0.66/mi. 0.46/mi. 0.59/mi. 0.76/mi. 0.63/mi. 0.84/mi. I.00/mi.
COST PERCOSEAT TRIP 5.22+ 480.+ 4.50+ 3.90+ 4.58+ 4.63+ 3.78+(S) 0.033/mi. 0.0228/mi. 0.0204/mi. 0.019/mi. O.017/mi. O.OI9/mi. O.021/mi.
FLJLRE 3.5
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FIGURE 3.6
COST PER SEAT TRIP
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TABLE 3.4
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
H.S. 748 F-27-500/ F-27 CONVAIR 580 US-40
FH-227
PASSENGER 40-62 52-56 48 44-56 40
CAPACITY
MAXIMUM
TAKEOFF 44,495 45,000 43,500 54,600 43,297
WEIGHT (LB)
MAXIMUM
CRUISE 235 264 265 340 508
SPEED (MPH)
TAKEOFF
DISTANCE 4,800 5,459 5,400 4,900 5,700
REQUIRED (FT)
RANGE WITH
MAXIMUM 500 650 650 1,000 1,000
PAYLOAD (MI)
FIGURE 3,7
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TABLE 3.5
ECONOMIC COMPARISON
H.S,748 F-27-500/ F-27 CONVAIR 580 US-40
FH-227
$/BLOCK HR. 246,5 244.8 232.1 194.7 362.0
S/AVAILE 0.038 0.040 0.044 0.028 0.064
COST PER 159.19 + 146.64 + 138.96 + 114.98 + 194.4 +
AIRCfT TRIP 0,74/MI, 0.78 MI, 0.74/MI. 0 44/MI, 0.62/MI.
COST PER 2.57 + 2.62+ 2.89 2 05+ 4.86+
SEAT TRIP .012/MI, ,014/MI, .015/MI, .068/MI, .016/MI.
FIGURE 3.8
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FIGURE 3.9
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most attractive on a cost per aircraft trip basis, and because
of its higher speed (relative to the DHC - 6) does not fare too
badly on a cost per seat trip basis compared to the higher con-
figuration aircraft. Its field length requirements, although
not as favorable as the Twin Otter's, are still good (2,800 feet),
and in many ways the Metro appears as a reasonable investment for
those airlines where a 20 passenger configuration is sufficient
and STOL capability (2,000 feet or less) is not required. The
Metro, however, has only recently gone into service (Commuter
Airlines of Binghamton, New York and Air Wisconsin) and opera-
tional experience will show how accurate the manufacturer's es-
timates are upon which the comparisons were made.
Similar caveats apply to the other non-operational air-
craft - the DHC - 7, Falcon 30, VFW 614. It is somewhat sur-
prising to note that the YAK 40, despite its low initial pur-
chase price, does not compare more favorably with the higher
priced Falcon 30 and VFW 614. The basic performance drawback
of the YAK 40 appears to be its relatively slow cruising speed.
Among the larger aircraft, the old Convair 580 (the Allison
turboprop re-engined Convair 340 or 440) appears to be the most
attractive aircraft by almost all criteria. On the economic
side, the low initial purchase price of the aircraft is par-
tially responsible for the favorable showing. However, even at
3 or 4 times the assumed selling price of $250,000, the CV-580
is still a substantially superior aircraft on all counts except
field length requirements, where the DHC - 7, designed for STOL
performance, dominates.
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In general, it appears that new jet aircraft do not have
any outstanding edge over the turboprops. However, it should
be kept in mind that these new aircraft are not designed-with
low cost being the primary criterion. The US - 40, for example,
is designed as essentially a miiature B-747. Cruise speed,
take-off and landing performance and passenger comfort standards
are equal to those of the latest generation wide-bodied trans-
ports. An austere jet transport, more appropriate for low/medium
short haul service, would undoubtedly compare more favorably with
the turboprops.
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3.3 Market Potential
There are two clearly identifiable markets for new
aircraft: one is the replacement market, the other is the
supplementary market, ie. aircraft needed for expanding traffic
patterns. To some degree they overlap, as when airlines decide
upon fleet standardization and aircraft are replaced without
being obsolete, either in terms of function or market acceptance.
However, the division, although artificial, allows a planner
to more clearly identify the possible total overall market.
In the low/medium density area, the approximate size of
aircraft required is in the 20 -60 passenger range. There is
another clear dividing line drawn by the CAB at 30 passengers
(at this time), under which commuter air carriers can operate aircraft
without full CAB regulation (or certification). They are not exempt
from the more stringent safety rules of the FAA (FAR 121) that
apply to transport aircraft over 12,5001bs. maximum gross
take-off weight.
In the replacement market, it is possible to identify about
2,000 aircraft in scheduled passenger service that are piston or
turboprop (Table 3.6). In the United States, the local service
airlines have about 200 larger turboprops in service (FH-227,
F-27, CV-580, CV-600 and YS-11). Even though these aircraft
are still serviceable and quite economical to operate, as noted
ESTIMATED MI D - 1972
NUMBER AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT OF 20-60 PAX CAPACITY
IN SCHEDULED PASSENGER SERVICE IN THE WORLD *
DHC-6 DC-3 DC-4 CV-240 CV-580 YS-II HS748 VISCOUNT F.27
OF WORLD (TWIN 340- -600 (700, FH.
OTTER) 440 800 ) 227
WESTERN EUROPE (285) 13 40 1 6 63 I 8 10 67 67
NORTH AMERICA (423) 95 50 4 6 133 23 3 20 89
CENTRAL AMERICA(NCME(146) 44 50 8 1 9 9 - 14 2 -(I NC. MEXICO)
SOUTH AMERICA (280) 17 II 1 23 28 7 16 40 22 16
AFRICA (213) 12 92 35 2 4 2 4 1 5. 47
ASIA (457) 18 1 41 22 1 6 3 78 43 33 103
AUSTRALIA +PACIFIC (172) 22 62 5 - 4 2 6 5 66
TOTALS 221 546 113 134 .161 129 120 164 388
EXCLUDING EASTERN EUROPE AND CHINA TOTAL - 1976
TABLE 3.6
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in the previous section, in due time they will be phased out
and replacements needed. A new forty-sixty passenger aircraft
would appear to have a ready made market in the United States
alone, depending on its economics.
It is probably fair to estimate that at least an equal
number of aircraft of the same type are in use by the military or
other government agencies. Thus there appears to be a need for
1000 airplanes to (still) replace the DC-3 alone around the
world.
Table 3.6 also points out the fact that less than a
quarter of the demand for these replacement aircraft is likely
to come from North America. This picture is quite different
when compared to overall air travel, where about half of the
world's total is concentrated in the North American continent.
The diverse nature of the demand can be seen by examining
Table 3.7, the orders for Fokker F28's an existing replacement
aircraft for the piston and turboprops shown in Table 3.6. It can
be .seen that not only is demand likely to come from all parts
of the world, but that the orders for the aircraft are likely to
come in small quantities. This suggests a requirement for world-
wide marketing capability. It must also be recognized that
orders for a new airplane will not come in a few large lots
from a few airlines, but rather in small numbers from a great
many sources and likely stretched out over a long period of time.
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Table 3.7
F 28 AIRCRAFT ORDERS AS OF FEBRUARY 1, 1973
Air Nauru (Central Pacific Republic of Nauru) 1
Ansett Transport Industries (Australia) 5
Aviaction (Germany) 3
Bonair-Germanair (Germany) 4
Braathens SAFE (Norway) 5
Fairchild Industries (U.S. and Canada) 10
Garuda (Indonesia) 6
Iberia (Spain) 3
Itavia 3
Linjeflyg (Sweden) 3
LTU (German) 4
Martinair (Belgium) 1
Nigeria Airways 2
Government of Nigeria 1
Pelita/Pertamina 1
Government of Argentina 1
Government of Colombia 1
Government of the Netherlands 1
THY (Turkey) 5
60
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The supplementary market is more difficult to determine.
Although overall air travel is likely to grow at 7%-12% per
annum into the late 1900's, this growth will generate demand
for large aircraft (of DC-9 size up) rather than the aircraft
useful in the low/medium density area. The growth of commuter
air carriers in the United States will likely continue as
local service airlines (and trunks) are allowed to abandon
marginal points, as well as by traffic increases on already
established routes. The structure of commuter operations seems
to indicate that their expansionary needs will be met by
smaller (less than 30 passengers) turboprops of the Beech 99,
Twin Otter, Swearingen Metro, Shorts SD3-30 variety.
New route networks can also be hypothesized for trunks
and local service airlines: an increase in the major hub bypass
routes; direct service between smaller cities; more hub-and-
spoke patterns. Thus a market of supplementing the current
fleets with smaller aircraft (40-60 passengers) may also appear
in the near future in the United States. However, it is unlikely
that this demand will exceed 200 planes.
In summary, the greatest potential market for a low/medium
density aircraft will be outside the North American continent,
and there will be some 2,000 aircraft of this type that will
need replacement in the near future.
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4. ECONOMIC ANALYSES
4.1 Basic Issues
4.1.1 Introduction
This section discusses the costs of providing air service
to low-density markets, with particular emphasis on the excess
of cost over income. The material below is general and illus-
trative and raises the major economic issues.
4.1.2 Simple Rules for Approximating the Costs of Air Transportation
Air transportation as discussed here is a premium trans-
portation mode. Air travel is faster, safer, and more comfortable
than the other existing means of travel. It is, however, more
expensive. It is quite possible to construct an air transpor-
tation system which has both costs and total time convenience
approaching existing bus operations. Such deviations from pre-
sent conditions are not discussed below. The transportation that
is considered is fast, available, and dear. Essentially, it
is suited to contributing to the travel and interaction which
is part of day-to-day commerce.
As a consequence of this limitation, one unusual, .and
convenient assumption can be made. That is that load fac-
tors cannot rise above 50 %, a maximum average. In short-haul
operations most travellers can get a seat if the annual average
load factor is 50 percent. Above 60 percent load factor the
probability of full flights at peak hours becomes so high that
the premium convenience aspect of air transporation no longer
applies. Variations within this band can produce as much as a
10 percent change in airline costs, although adjustments to
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equipment utilization may compensate somewhat. A 10"/ varia-
cion, is not large with respect to the changes in costs
discussed Delow, so a constant load factor of 50 percent
will be assumed throughout.
Thus, the following three statements about airline
operating costs can be made:
i.) The distance dependence of the operating cost of an air-
craft can be described in terms of dollars per takeoff plus
dollars per cruise mile.
ii.) The size dependence of the operating cost of an air-
craft can be described as dollars per aircraft plus an add-
itional cost for each passenger seat of aircraft design size.
iii.) Indirect operating costs may be described by five
numbers:
IOC per passenger boarding;
IOC per passenger mile;
IOC per aircraft mile;
IOC per aircraft departure;
Overhead as a percent of all other costs;
For the purposes of the discussions to follow, the following
numbers will be used to approximate these values:
i.) Aircraft cost is based on cost per block hour.
Block time = .175 hours + 430 mph. This establishes a
linear rise in cost with a distance and a fixed zero distance
intercept.
ii.) Block hour costs (derived from parametric designs done
at the FTL) are $210 per aircraft hour plus $4.25 per air-
craft seat hour. It should not be surprising that aircraft
cost should have a part not dependent on the number of seats,
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since all aircraft, however small or large, need certain
minimums of equipment plus a pilot and copilot.
iii.) IOC's were estimated using a regression analysis
of local service carriers reported IOC's* as a general
guide. They are:
IOC per passenger boarding = $5.00;
IOC per passenger mile = $0.007;
IOC per aircraft mile = $0.10;
IOC per aircraft departure = $12.00;
Overhead = 10 percent.
For a 40-seat aircraft at 50 percent load factor, the
linear per-passenger cost-versus-distance relationship depicted
in Figure 4.1 results.
A similar plot illustrates the change in per passenger costs
with aircraft size and distance. Figure 4.2 is the same relation-
ship as Figure 4.1 but with several aircraft sizes. Figure 4.3
plots the aircraft size dependence for a fixed distance. These
figures show clearly the sharp rise in per passenger costs
which occurs when traffic densities are low and the aircraft are
small.
The most important point to glean from the above discussion
is that the cost per seat of an airline service rises as the air-
craft size decreases.
4.1.3 Fare Taper and Costs
Figure 4.1 shows the rise of per passenger trip costs
*Simpson and Taneja. A Multi-Regression Analysis of Airline IOC's
FTL Report 67-2, Dec. 1967.
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with distance for a 40-seat aircraft at 50 percent load factor.
Figure 4.4 has the same cost line. In addition, Figure 4.4 has
a revenue line representing a typical revenue yield for such dis-
tances. The actual fares are diluted to a revenue yield of
$7. + $0.0735 per mile.* The revenue line is different from the
cost line. Thus, trips under 200 miles are bound to lose money
at 50% load factor while those over 200 miles can show a profit.
Such a revenue-cost relationship has long existed in short-
haul markets, which explains why so few airlines like short haul.
However, lately the new fare structures have increased the zero-
distance fare necessary to make the revenue line sit above the
cost line at very short distances. As this trend continues
short haul markets can become profitable.
Fare taper problems occur under similar conditions as air-
craft size problems, and tend to exacerbate them. With today's
fare structure the aircraft size problem has become the dom-
inant one, and is the only one emphasised in the succeeding
sections.
4.1.4 The Revenues: Demand Approximations
.It is usually assumed that the demand for transportation
can change with changing costs and quality of service. When
discussing the air mode, the costs are always above ground modes;
but the quality of service is superior. Still, an airline can
increase its total traffic by increasing the quality of its
service. Common moves are to increase the speed or frequency
of a particular service, or to substitute direct routings for
connections and multistops.
*The fare level is chosen merely to illustrate the point.
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These moves are a corporate reaction to their perception of
demand elasticity with respect to time. The more convenient
the service, the more people use it. Mathematically,
Demand = K/T
As the travel time (T) goes up, the traffic goes down
(Figure 4.5a). 0 is the time elasticity, a number typically
between 1 and 2*.
The time term (T) in the equation above is usually as-
sumed to be the traveller's total perceived time occupied
travelling. This includes driving to the airport, buying a
ticket, waiting for .the next departure, flying, and
getting to his destination. Thus doubling the speed of an
aircraft does not, by any means, cut the travel time in half.
The other interesting aspect of this total travel time figure
is the part called schedule wait. This is the time inconvenience
associated with the frequency (or lack of frequency) of service.
The schedule wait is usually assumed to be half the average head-
way. With one or two flights a day, a third flight is a vast
improvement; but above 6 or 10 flights, additional service is
not important. Mathematically:
Demand = K/(T + W/frequency)
Here To is the fixed time (access, egress, and travel), and
*For this discussion a value of 2 will be used, as typical for
short haul.
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W/frequency is the schedule wait. Figure 4.5b.illustrates
the typical dependence implied by this relationship.
The other, and equally important, way of changing the
travel time is to change the T by going to direct routings
or faster aircraft. Any reduction in travel time influences
the total demand. Figure 4.6a illustrates this variation.
Demand also reacts to the changes in total travel price.
A formulation just like the one for time is typical:
Demand = K/Pe
Here P is the price of travel and *( the price elasticity,
which is near 1 or 2. The dependence at o(= 2, typical of
short haul,is illustrated in Figure 4.6b and will be used for
the remainder of this discussion.
Both the time and price variation of demand can be ex-
pressed simultaneously:
Demand = K/T p"
The intrinsic market size is specified by K, not by
the actual demand under some specific conditions. Passengers
attracted depends on service, but the market strength K,
does not. K depends on demographic variables such as popu-
lation, industrial activity, etc. for the city pair market.
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K is a small number in low-density markets, reflecting the
general lack of interested travellers.
4.1.5 Revenue and Costs: A Free Market Study
To examine the underlying market forces of costs and
services it was assumed that an airline has a monopoly and
is able to adjust both fares and frequency.
Initially the airline is serving a 100 mile market
four times a day with a forty seat aircraft and boarding only
25 passengers a day each way, for an actual load factor of 16%.
The net revenue per passenger is $14.35. The net cost per
seat at a "normal" 50% load factor is $16.87, so even in
"normal" conditions the airline would lose $2.55 per passenger.
Rationally an enterprising airline would use a smaller
aircraft. A 12.5 seat aircraft can carry 25 passengers on
four flights a day at 50/ load factor for a total (one way)
cost of $729. The total cost using a 40 seat aircraft was
$948. In both cases the total revenue is the same: $359.
Assume the airline attempts to raise prices to cover
the new lower costs. The total costs are $729 under the
new scheme, and the total passengers are 25. The breakeven
fare at 50% load factor should be $29.16: this is nearly
double the previous fare.
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This enormous $29 fare is the cost of operating the
very small 12.5 seat aircraft. Indeed the cost per passenger
actually carried on the 40 seat aircraft (which was at 16%
load factor) was more, $37.92 to be exact.
At $29.16, less passengers show up. The price is too
high. According to the demand model only 6 people remain
interested in the service.
At this point the airline decides to cut the frequency
of service. One flight a day is recommended.
Now the reduction is frequency from 4 to 1 produces an
added schedule wait of 6 hours. This increases the total
trip time, which discourages traffic. Only 6 passengers a
week show up for a once-a-day $29 trip. The only remaining
step seems to be to discontinue service entirely.
The same scenario can be reconsidered with a larger mar-
ket size. Assume that the starting conditions are fare = $14.35,
and Frequency = 4 flights per day. This time the operator is
flying a 60 seat aircraft and carrying 100 originating passen-
gers per day.
At 50% load factor, the cost per passenger is $12.06,
so if the aircraft were fully utilized, a profit would be
possible. However, the load factor is only 42%. Revenues
are $1,435 and costs are $1,551, so a loss is incurred.
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The airline attempts to raise the load factor by reducing
the frequency of service to 3 flights. The daily traffic drops
to 72 passengers due to the decreased convenience of the ser-
vice. Total income is now $1,030.00. Expenses are $1143.00.
Load factor is now 40% and the total losses have risen.
The reduction in frequency created an even greater
reduction in market size through the mechanism of reaction to
the level of service.
The management decides to employ a smaller aircraft. A
48 seat vehicle is obtained. The frequency is maintained at
3 flights per day and the fare remains fixed. Because service
does not change, revenues do not change (they are $1030 from
72 passengers). Load factor is 50% Total costs are only $1026.
The airline is finally making a profit.
But what if, instead of reducing the vehicle size, they
had raised the fare? At 72 passengers the expenses were $15.90
per passenger. However, at that fare only 63 passengers show
up. Rather than raise fares again, the frequency is cut to
two flights a day. This reduces the market size to 36. Once
again costs outrun revenues. Now a 36 seat aircraft is sought.
By now, not even this remedy is sufficient. In fact, at this
point only a careful look at the situation will prevent the air-
line from ceasing to serve what in fact can be. a viable market.
Observe that the market started at 100 passengers a
day for -four flights at $14.35 a ticket. Since e and V are
assumed to be 2, K in the demand function is 288,000. This
is the market size or density. If the aircraft size is con-
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nuously reduced from some large number, say 100 seats, and
at the same time the airline always flies exactly the frequency
which generates a 500/ load factor, initially the traffic will grow.
The small increase in prices (which equals cost in this case)
associated with smaller aircraft sizes is compensated for by
a sizeable decrease in schedule wait due to the increased fre-
quency. Figure 4.7 illustrates this case. The price
rise begins to accelerate as very small aircraft sizes are
approached and at the same time additional frequencies above
4 or 5 add little convenience. Eventually the total traffic
takes a turn downward.
Thus, for some values of frequency and cost
a maximum number of passengers are served. For the 100 passen-
ger market the maximum traffic is 137 passengers. The oper-
ating conditions are 7.5 flights per day with a 37 seat air-
craft. The fare is $17.20. Thus with both fare and frequency
higher than the starting conditions, more people desire the
service. In fact, the demand is twice that achieved in the
case above using a larger and cheaper (per seat) aircraft. The
larger market is being served in such a way as to please the
greatest number of people.
In .the study of the 25 passenger market it was
seen that some markets can never reach a point where airline
revenues equal cost. Between the infeasible and the finan-
cially attractive there is a minimum viable market size. This
market size can be determined mathematically. In this example
it occurs when K = 256,000. At 53 origins per day a profit
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is shown using a 23 seat aircraft flying 4 times a day
with a fare of $20.40. If the standard service of 4 flights
at $14.35 were flown it would carry 93 passengers and lose money.
The 25 passenger case had less than one third of the
necessary market density. It could not be served at regional
airline standards without a loss.
The conclusion of these case. studies will come as a
surprise to no one. There are some markets too small to be
served without subsidy support. The few passengers that are
available cannot afford the cost of an aircraft, however small,
to provide the service.
4.1.6 The Effects of Regulatory Constraints on the Free Market
Solution.
In the real world fare cannot change with costs. Fre-
quency of service in some cases can change. Under these con-
ditions there still exists the tradeoff between operating low
frequencies with low incomes and higher frequencies with greater
incomes but greater costs. Indeed a point exists where the
net profit is at a maximum. For a low density market the op-
timum is at a minimum loss, which is no service and costs;
for higher densities it is at maximum profits. The same
basic assumptions apply: various aircraft sizes exist, seat
costs increase with decreasing size, and the total passenger
traffic responds to frequency of service. With this a relation-
ship for the optimum aircraft size and frequency for various
market densities can be developed. Figure 4.8 illustrates
this. The horizontal axis is calibrated in tems of passehgers
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attracted to the basic 4 flights at $14.35 service pattern.
This corresponds to the market density K. The actual passengers,
aircraft size, daily frequency, and daily loss (or gain)
are shown for a 100 mile market in Figures 4.8 and 4.9.
The point at which the ..airline begins to endure a
loss occurs at a somewhat higher market density than the
free market situation would suggest. The constraint of
fixed ticket price prohibits the market forces from seeking
the optimal solution.
Below this level, the optimal solution is always no
service, because no service generates no losses.
Consider an approximation of the existing regulated
conditions in low density markets. In the final and most
highly constrained case both fare and frequency are fixed
at minimum levels. The fare is $14.35 for a 100 mile jour-
ney, and the frequency of service is four flights per day.
Figure 4.10 illustrates the total costs and total in-
comes for the situation where the airline always has just
the right size aircraft for any market size. Below 110 ori-
gins a day, and below a 55 seat aircraft, a loss is incurred
on a fully allocated cost basis.
4.1.7 Conclusions of Economic Analysis Without Subsidy
Frequency of service is essential to providing a useful
air transportation link. This frequency becomes too expensive
to provide for low density markets because of the high costs asso-
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ciated with the very small aircraft sizes which are appropriate.
The use of too large an aircraft quickly becomes too expen-
sive, and can render a marginally viable market impossible
to serve without a loss.
It has further been demonstrated that a small increase
in the price of a service can sometimes permit a very attractive
expansion of that service and a net increase in that passen-
gers carried.
4.2 Subsidy Issues
4.2.1 The Need for Subsidy
Congress has willed that no community of significant size
should do without the benefits of public air transportation.
This is a matter of public policy, and shall not be discussed
below. Wherever the market density is so low that no ser-
vice can be viable in a free market situation, the government
must provide additional payments to the airlines to maintain
service." In addition in some cases when the free market would
dictate a higher price or the substitution of a commuter car-
rier, moneys must be made available to compensate for operation
at a level of service which is not optimal.
4.4.4 Operators of Subsidized Service
Only two kinds of airlines are willing to provide sub-
sidized air service: the regional carriers and the smaller
commuter carriers.
The level of cost and the level of service provided by
the regional carriers is close to that which is typical of
the biggest and best trunk services in the country. At least
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it is possible for a regional air carrier to emulate the
highest standards of reliability, safety, and service. It
is not at all clear that these carriers always provide the
trunkline service standards on routes where passenger reve-
nues do not pay the costs of the service.
Commuter air carriers, however, are viewed as providing
less reliable and less safe operations. These two accusations
are very likely false in any particular market. The commuters
often display greater reliability than the regionals and equal
safety standards. Nonetheless the public views commuter ser-
vice as a reduction from the comfort of service of the regionals.
At low market densities passengers appear willing to
sacrifice comfort for convienence. Whenever a commuter success-
fully replaces a regional carrier, the market responds to a
better approximation of its desires. Being caught on the
rising part of the cost curve, low density markets relax comfort
standards to gain frequency at minimum expense.
Thus, at least today,-there are two possible operators of
subsidized services - the regionals with higher comfort stan-
dards, better image, and higher costs, and the commuters with
a greater ability to provide higher frequencies of service.
Historically this has not always been the case. When the
regionals were engaged almost exclusively in serving low den-
sity markets, they did so with the DC-3, an airplane with which
the Beech 99 might be compared today.
However, whoever is chosen to provide subsidized setvice,
it is necessary to choose the most efficient form of the
subsidy.
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4.2.3 Subsidy on a Standard Cost Basis Adjusted for Income
It is possible to offer to make up the difference between
the revenues and the cost of providing some minimum frequency
of service by direct subsidy. To do so it is necessary to
specify some maximum reasonable costs. The difficulties in
this method are two fold:
First the method provides little or no incentive to use
the correct size and type of aircraft in providing the service.
As long as efficient use is made of the aircraft, and as long
as the maximum permissible size is not exceeded, all costs are
paid for.
Secondly, there is little or no incentive to provide a
quality of service which will actually attract passengers. In-
deed if cost savings below the standard costs can be made by a
schedule less convenient to the passengers, then the carrier
has every incentive to do so because his loss of revenues is
covered by the subsidy.
4.2.4 Cross Subsidy
Another method of subsidy to regional airlines
is cross subsidy. The airline is given a route which, by its
standards, can be served at a cost well below revenues. This
excess profit is then permitted to counter-balance losses in-
curred on low density routes. In effect the monopoly position
in the large market is exploited by fixing a higher price* than
that which would occur in the economists world of perfect competi-
*The CAB standard fare allows excess profit if market size is
large enough, See above.
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competition. The resulting uneconomic situation of under-
service and over-cost in the dense market is so typical that it
is generally accepted without notice. The excess profits are
then dedicated to replacing Federal subsidy. Thus, what is
called route strengthening by the CAB is a means of levening
a tax on a specific set of airline passengers in order to pro-
vide a subsidy to a second set of passengers.
In addition this approach leads to the use of two very
different aircraft types by the regionals. One aircraft must
be small enough to provide subsidized service where the per
trip costs must be minimized at the expense of seat costs.
The other must be large enough to have per seat costs below
the fixed fare levels in the higher density routes. It is
interesting to note, too, that the large routes are usually
much longer hauls than the smaller aircraft can even serve.
4.2.5 Subsidy on a Bid System
The bid system of subsidy is an economist's dream. A
perfect utilization of resources is guaranteed. No over
payments or disincentives to economy exist. In addition, there
is at least some incentive to increase passenger traffic through
high levels of service.
Under the bid system, a small community will be connec-
ted to the nearest hub by at least four flights a day. The
fare must not exceed $20 a trip, and the aircraft used must
fly under Part 121 regulations for the next 3 years.
If there is a sizeable market and if the stop fits nicely
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into the existing route networks, perhaps a regional carrier
would put in the lowest bid. If not a commuter carrier, one
with a small aircraft such as a Cessna 402, would win the
contract. The commuter might fly 6 times a day at $18 to
maximize his profits.
The bid system seems to solve all the financial problems
with elegant simplicity. However, there are some objections:
1) Safety of service may slip if the operation loses
money. There is a suspicion that FAA is unable to prevent a
carrier whose total operations are losing money from cutting
corners on maintenance and operations.
2) Service may be terminated by bankruptcy. This seems
preventable or remediable by any number of simple rules. The
posting of a performance bond seems most promising.
3) Service may be provided at a token level merely to
"buy in" to the market. In general, the carrier who first and
continuously serves a market would have high expectation of
receiving the CAB franchise (route award) for a semi-perma-
nent monopoly in the market. In this case some markets might
be auctioned off at a "negative" subsidy.
4) There is still no incentive to maximize service
in order to maximize passenger revenues in cases where the
number of passengers is extremely small. Here even the marginal
cost of service exceeds the marginal revenue.
5) The dramatic change in subsidy policy may render the
existing fleet of 40 to 60 seat aircraft owned by the regionals
less valuable. This effect is discussed in Chapter 6.
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4.2.6 Subsidy by Aircraft Lease
Many markets which cannot be economically served or which
cannot be economically served at existing fare levels can be
rendered attractive if the operating costs of the airlines are
cut. One way to reduce the operating costs is to reduce air-
craft DOC by leasing aircraft from the government for $1.00
a year. It has been said that no airline buys an aircraft
to minimize losses. Thus by "forcing" a small aircraft on
the regionals in place of subsidy it is possible to override
the equipment decisions of the management and favor economic
services to small communities. Unfortunately this move has
other consequences:
1) The presence of an artifically cheap aircraft would
make it in the regional airlines interest not only to serve
markets presently in need of subsidy but to increase service
to many other markets beyond the point that supply and demand
had previously indicated was best. Thus the regionals would
use two or three "free" aircraft for every one it would use if
it had to pay the full costs. The government underwriting
of the costs would double or triple.
2) The presence of an artificially cheap aircraft immedi-
ately depreciates the value of all aircraft of similar size on
the market. The government is presumably liable for this loss
both from present owners of such craft and from manufacturers
whose future markets have been eliminated.
3) The perfect size aircraft for subsidized markets is
far from constant. In places where density is extremely low
and no other markets of similar size are nearby, even a five
seat aircraft may be too large. In cases where two or three
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remote towns can be served on the same route, a 60 seat air-
craft may be just right. The optimum aircraft size depends
on both airline network and market density effects.
4) The provision of a "free" aircraft does not
reduce costs sufficiently t-o guarantee service to most of
the low density points currently subsidized.
4.2.7 Defining Level of Service
The above discussions of subsidy method should indicate
that one of the arts of managing subsidized service lies in
stating what service is desired. The normal market forces
do not encourage the airline to best serve the existing
passenger traffic. In fact in any market which is not of
itself viable, the airline is naturally advised to minimize
costs without attention to loss of revenues. Therefore,
minimum levels of service must be specified.
Any degree of freedom left to the operator will be ex-
ploited. This is the opposite of the case in viable markets.
In medium and high density markets, the fare is fixed and all
other aspects of service are left to the operators discretion.
Thus by varying frequency and comfort, the operator can come
close to achieving the overall service package which the
free market forces might suggest was optimal.. For subsidized
service, everything must be fixed:
fares
frequency of service
scheduling of departures
routings - nonstop or multistop
aircraft comfort
aircraft safety
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There is some difficulty in matching these requirements
to the needs of the several types of subsidized markets. Ser-
vice to remote communities requires timing with respect to
connecting flights. Service in low density non-isolated mar-
kets requires high frequencies to compete successfully with
ground transportation. Service to communities whose claim
is based on historical or political grounds requires, per-
haps, merely the dignity of service rather than its convenience.
In any case the level of service in any individual case is a
nice balance between local needs and national expense.
4.2.8 Alternatives to Subsidy
The need or desire for subsidized air service in low
density markets may be reduced in the future. The first method
of reducing subsidy can be a reduction in cost with a minimum
loss of convenience. This could be done by a number of
means:
1) A reduction in aircraft size. The use of light planes
to offer service in small markets can provide a service sche-
dule at reduced costs by reducing the number of empty seats
flown, with very little loss of convenience.
2) A reallocation of services from two flights a day in
two directions to four flights a day to the nearest hub. A
single higher frequency service can increase the perceived
mobility of people in both isolated or non-isolated commun-
ities and cause noticable traffic growth.
3) The use of high frequency service on alternate days.
It may well be possible to provide a useful schedule of
departures to a community on an every other day basis at much
reduced cost. A periodic schedule of services permitting
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round trip journeys to be completed in one day may be an
improvement over one which forces all trips to be overnights.
4) Call stop routings may permit services to be offered
to some small points only at hours when passengers actually
exist. Thus points would be bypassed unless passengers ac-
tually existed on the specific day. This is really only a
small saving in cost and perhaps less effective than subsi-
dized air taxi services.
5) The last and most talked about means of reducing sub-
sidy is the use of commuter airline service standards in place
of existing higher cost regional carriers. Although costs may
be immediately cut in half, and service improve, the regula-
tory.system has not in the past been able to prevent growth
into a cost structure not so well designed for low density
service.
The second method of reducing the subsidy bill is to
reduce the number of points where service is deemed a need.
This can be done by imposing various limits or encouraging
other means of providing the service:
1) In non-isolated subsidized markets service can be
dropped entirely.
2) In isolated subsidized markets the local community
can be urged to provide some of the subsidy for what is, in
fact, a local benefit. Pueblo, Colo. has persuaded Frontier
to provide service up to local standards in this manner. Other
communities offer implicit subsidies to commuters and regionals.
In some cases ticket sales have been locally guaranteed.
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3) In some locations subsidized bus service might
provide a suitable alternative to air. This is particularly
true in short range operations, where the overall speed ad-
vantage may lie with the bus.
4) Subsidized services could have a maximum per passen-
ger subsidy limit of $10 or $20.
5) Subsidized operations could be subject to an active
"use it or lose it" limit of 20 boardings a day.
4.2.9 Summary of Subsidy Issues
The prime difficulties in managing subsidized services
lie in knowing how to devicethe regulations to achieve the
desired ends with a minimum of cost. The operator has every
natural incentive not to provide service since costs exceed
revenue. Thus the desired service must be clearly specified,
and the means of subsidy designed to reward the operator for
achieving those ends with a minimum of cost. The service as
perceived by the passenger should be specifically controlled,
while the means of achieving that effect left to the manager-
ial abilities of the airlines.
There appear to be ways for encouraging more
economic performance of existing benefits and for discrimin-
ating among markets where benefits are few and costs are high
and those where a little subsidy creates a lot of service.
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4.3 Freight Potential
4.3.1 Local Servicel
The freight ton-miles for the local service industry grew
from about 7 million in 1962 to over 65 million in 1972 - an
average annual growth of almost 25 percent. In contrast the
trunk lines expanded from about 475 million tons to over 2
billion tons during the same time period, but at an average
annual growth of only 16 percent. Freight revenues represent
about 4% of the locals total revenues (60% of the public ser-
vice revenues) as compared with 6% for the trunks.
The local service carriers view freight as a by-product
service as the trunks have for years. It is, however, an im-
portant service to many of the small communities they serve.
This creates a problem when a local carrier either deletes a
point, or is replaced by a commuter operating small aircraft with-
out the freight capacity. Often business in the town suffers.
If new aircraft are to be designed for the local service
industry, the need for freight capacity must be kept in mind.
It offers the potential of offsetting passenger losses in many
lower density markets if the capacity exists and is properly mar-
keted.
4.3.2 Commuters
Although the volume of freight handled by the commuter carriers
is relatively small compared to the local and trunk carriers, there
is tremendous potential for growth in this area. In 1971, the 123
commuter carriers listed with the Civil Aeronautics Board carried
1 Data derived from Air Transport Facts and Figures. Air Trans-
portation Association of America (1973)
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almost 30,000 tons of cargo 2 , a 28 percent growth over the
previous year. If mail is included, they carry about a fourth
of the total cargo volume handled by the local service carriers.
One of the major problems facing the commuters is the im-
balance between in-bound and out-bound freight. Since these car-
riers are known locally, they generate out-bound freight.
In-bound freight, however, has generally been transferred from
the certificated air carriers to motor carriers and not to the
commuters. Shippers also use the motor carriers since the com-
muter carriers were not listed in either the Air Freight Directory
published by Air Cargo Inc. or the Air Cargo Guide.
To alleviate this situation about forty commuter carriers and
air taxi operators have signed an agreement with Emery Air Freight
Corporation to carry Emery Air Freight shipments on a priority
basis, using Emery airbills and the Emery computer system for
tracing, rating, routing, and billing of traffic. This agreement
should balance the in-bound and out-bound traffic flows. Also,
the commuter carriers are now listed in the Air Cargo Guide under
Commuter Airlines Air Freight Directory. This will provide a
significant exposure to the shippers and consignees, especially
those desiring service to and from the off-line communities.
The Emery agreement should give the commuters access to
freight which is currently transported by surfact carriers to
and from off-line communities and "hub" cities for transportation
by air. The Cargo and Mail Conference of NATC reports that
"under this agreement, the carriers would bring freight
to and from some 303 smaller cities and jet hub centers
where major Emery installations are in operation. Of
2In addition these carriers transported 50,000 tons of mail-
a growth of 38 percent over the previous year.
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these 303 communities, 202 are unserved by any form
of regional or trunk airline service." 3
This change will improve the financial conditions of the commuter
carriers and at the same time provide local industries with im-
proved channels of distribution, saving a full day in transit
time.
Another area of significant growth in commuter freight traffic
is the carriage of small package shipments. This is an unprofitable
area for the large certificated carrier because of high ground
handling costs. The certificated carrier is therefore interested
in handling only large shipments.
The commuter carrier, on the other hand, with low overhead costs
and aircraft of smaller capacity, can offer service to the shipper
of small packages. An example is Federal Express, a truly small
package airline. The carrier's jet equipment and routes are de-
signed to transport small packages 'overnight, with door-to-door
delivery using a fleet of company-owned courier cars. In addition,
the company owns and operates a million dollar sorting facility
which can handle ten thousand packages every hour.
The commuter carriers can also achieve economies through con-
solidation. Emery, for example, consolidates shipments of normal
cargo traffic aboard the smaller commuter aircraft using Quarter-
D containers. Four of these containers fill the standard D con-
tainer used on the DC-9 and other aircraft. The Quarter-D con-
tainer allows the commuters to achieve the economies of contain-
erization and more effectively penetrate the local markets they
serve.
3Air Cargo & Mail News, November 17, 1972. Published by Cargo
and Mail Conference, division of National Air Transportation
Conference.
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Present commuter aircraft offer little cargo capacity when
fully loaded with passengers and baggage. The next generation
of commuter aircraft must provide a significant improvement in
this area in light of the rapid cargo growth. The new Metro of-
fers a moveable bulkhead that allows partial conversion to cargo
on lightly travelled flights. Quick change capability is also
essential so aircraft can be converted to cargo use during off
hours and rapidly be reconverted to meet peak passenger demand.
This is a valuable way of using excess mid-day capacity, parti-
cularly for the carrier whose trade is largely a morning in,
evening backorigin-destination traveller.
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5. SURVEY RESULTS
To evaluate markets for a 19 to 60 passenger aircraft,
all continental local service airlines and representative
commuter and other carriers were visited. In addition, sev-
eral manufacturers were interviewed to discover what their
market surveys of these markets indicated. Finally, interested
government and trade associations were contacted. Normally
the interview took place with vice-president of planning or
his senior staff.
Table 5.1 lists the parties visited.
TABLE 5.1
Carriers, Manufacturers, Government
and Associations Contacted
Local Service Carriers Intrastate Carrier
Allegheny Southwest
Frontier
Hughes Airwest Manufacturers
North Central BeechOzark Ozark BoeingPiedmont Cessna
Southern Fairchild
Texas International Grumman
Lockheed-CaliforniaCommuter Carriers Lockheed-Georgia
Air New England McDonnell-Douglas
Air Wisconsin
Altair Government
CommandeCommand Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of Operating RightsGolden West Dept. of Transportation
Metroflight Policy and International
Pilgrim Affairs
Ransome Advanced Systems Development
and Technology
Transportation Systems Center
Aspen
Wright Trade Associations
Associations of Local Trans-
port Airlines (ALTA)
National Air Transportation
Conferences (NATC)
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Rather than using questions and answers a general dis-
cussion of the topic area was encouraged. After explaining
what the project was about and the purpose of the visit, the
person being interviewed at a carrier was asked a rather broad
question such as "What are your future growth plans and what
type of aircraft is needed?" Similar questions were used at
the manufacturers and other groups contacted.
This approach was very effective in drawing out candid
opinions and exposing secondary issues that might not other-
wise have been discussed. However, it does make it difficult
to report the results without adding subjective interpretation.
Likewise, it is difficult to group answers to see if patterns
emerge. A survey that asks "Do you want a 50 passenger plane?
Yes or No? Why or Why not?" lends itself to statistical eval-
uation much more readily than the discussion approach. With
these difficulties in mind, the results have been tabulated
according to rough categories to present the data more meaning-
fully. Although judgement was used in grouping the answers,
the following tables are presented as objectively as possible
to accurately reflect the carriers views. However, there may
be some minor inconsistencies from one set of tables to the
next due to the grouping process. The text following each
table is admittedly a subjective interpretation of those views.
5.1 Carrier Survey
The general topics discussed were:
.Future growth plans
.Aircraft requirements
Size
Jet vs. Prop
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STOL or VTOL
Other Characteristics
.Cost trade-offs between purchase price and
operating costs
.Effects of unionization on these issues
.Potential impact of the Part 298 change
allowing commuters to use 30 passen-.
ger aircraft
.Views on present subsidy system
.Views on proposed bid system
TABLE 5.2
Growth Plans - Local Service Carriers
All Seek more long haul routes
1 Seeks trunk status within the next
few years
2 Seek expansion of long haul service
by developing more regional by-
pass routes
5 See a moderate expansion of the
basic service area
5.1.1 Discussion of Table 5.2
Long haul routes are the major source of profit for air-
lines under the present fare structure. As the local service
carriers acquire more jet aircraft capable of performing long
haul segments and learn to integrate them with their systems,
they see their profit potential increasing enormously. Since
resources are not unlimited, it is in the carriers best inter-
est to invest in these higher profit routes and equipment.
The extent of expansion into long haul routes is deter-
mined by each carrier's financial condition, route and market
structure. While only one carrier has the proper mix of those ele-
ments to eliminate its subsidy-eligible routes in the near fu-
ture, several would like to do the same. About half, however,
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felt they would and should not abandon service to the sub-
sidized points they were created to serve as long as there
was enough subsidy to cover losses. This latter group plans
to concentrate on gaining long haul routes that integrate
points on their systems, particularly those acquired during
the route strengthening program of the 1960's.
TABLE 5.3
Growth Plans - Commuter and Other Carriers
1 Plans to expand its role as a high density,
hub-and-spoke feeder.
1 Plans to primarily expand its role as a
high density, hub-and-spoke feeder,
but is looking for longer haul mar-
kets suited to high density STOL oper-
ations.
4 Plan to expand service in high density
areas, not as hub-and-spoke feeders,
but by providing origin-destination ser-
vice between larger hubs and smaller
communities in the megolopolis corridors.
6 Plan to expand service in regional feeder
markets, particularly where service
is abandoned by local service carriers.
5.1.2 Discussion of Table 5.3
Half the carriers in this sample serve high density mar-
kets and half provide service from low and medium density points
into hubs, clearly indicating the two distinct roles of the com-
muter airline. Since all the carriers interviewed have been in
existence for some time, they know how to compete in the
type of market they serve. Therefore, it is quite reasonable
that their expansion plans are based on the type of service they
already know and provide.
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TABLE 5.4
Local Service Aircraft Requirements
4 Plan to upgrade to an all-jet fleet
composed of presently available air-
craft of the DC 9, BAC 111, and 737
class.
3 Would like a jet replacement for pre-
sent turboprops.
1 Would like an all jet fleet, but would
be interested in a new under 70 passenger turbo-
prop if required to continue service
to subsidized points.
5.1.3 Discussion of Table 5.4
The carriers planning all present-day jet fleets are gen-
erally those planning the largest expansion, either to trunk
status or through the development of regional by-pass routings.
However, many of their present markets cannot support the small-
est of these aircraft. As a result, these points will be de-
leted from the system whenever possible. These carriers are
pragmatic. Rather than wait for an aircraft that would be ap-
propriate for their route structure, they will modify their net-
work to use the existing aircraft.
The remaining local service carriers have taken the oppo-
site approach. For one reason or another they do not feel they
can abandon all the points in their systems that will not sup-
port a current-generation jet. Consequently, they seek a new
aircraft to replace their aging propeller aircraft to serve
these lower density points. Three of these carriers felt the
aircraft had to be a jet. The fourth, however, would be inter-
ested in a modern turboprop because of its potentially lower
operating cost on short haul, low altitude segments.
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TABLE 5.5
Commuter Aircraft Requirements
(also includes inputs from locals with small aircraft experience)
4 Would like to upgrade their fleets
to 40-50 passenger aircraft in the
next 3 to 5 years.
3 Would like to eventually operate both
40-50 and under 20 passenger aircraft
at the same time.
2 Felt that an under 20 seat aircraft will
be satisfactory into the foreseeable
future and that there is no need for
anything larger.
3 Would like to have a 30 passenger air-
craft.
4 Felt that a 30 passenger aircraft has
little potential because of FAA regu-
latory constraints.
5.1.4 Discussion of Table 5.5
The variety of opinions concerning aircraft reflects the
diversity in the commuter industry itself. Carriers seeking
40 to 50 passenger aircraft are those operating in fairly dense
markets. Often their routes are long haul, with a higher per-
centage of origin-destination traffic than the high density,
hub-and-spoke operator.
This latter carrier is the type that would like to have
both large and small aircraft. Since the key to a successful
hub-and-spoke-feeder operation is frequency, they cannot use
all large aircraft that could not be flown as often economically.
Smaller planes are needed for frequency. But a few large air-
craft could be used in peak markets which already have enough
frequency. In areas where airport operations are limited, the
carrier must use larger aircraft to provide peak capacity rather
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than add extra sections.
Those who felt that an under 20 seat aircraft would meet
foreseeable needs have not yet saturated their markets with
frequency. Their growth is still based on providing more flights,
and the under 20 seat aircraft is cheaper to operate on a per-
flight basis.
Carriers desiring a 30 passenger aircraft felt it was the
best compromise between per seat cost and per trip cost. Although
a 40 passenger aircraft would have lower costs per seat, the cost
of the total trip would be higher. If the extra 10 seats are em-
pty, the 40 passenger plane would not be as productive as the 30.
On the other hand, once an aircraft has more than 19 seats, the
FAA requires a stewardess. Since aircraft of this size also ex-
ceed 12,500 pounds gross weight, additional FAA certification and
maintenance costs must be met. These additional costs must be
spread over 25-26 seats to reduce the per seat cost below that
of a 19 passenger aircraft. Finally, under the CAB's Part 298,
as modified in 1972, a commuter can operate a 30 passenger air-
craft without economic regulation by the Board. This also en-
courages the commuter to use a 30 seat plane.
A second group of carriers felt the 30 passenger aircraft
was useless for almost the same reasons. They did not think
that 30 passengers were enough to offset the regulatory cost of
exceeding 19 passengers and 12,500 pounds. This would require
at least 40 seats. Those who thought they could use 40 seats
much preferred it to a 30 seat version. Those who could not use
40 seats said they would prefer to stay at 19 or below. The de-
cision for 20, 30, or 40 always depended on the specific carrier's
cost and route structure.
134
After the formal survey, informal discussions were held with
some of the smaller commuters serving thin markets. They need a
better aircraft in the 10 seat range - again a function of their
specific cost and route structure.
5.1.5 Interest in STOL or VTOL
None of the local service carriers had any interest in
STOL or VTOL. They did not see any requirement for these types
of aircraft in the markets they serve now or might serve in the
future.
Some commuters, however, had a different response. Al-
though STOL capabilities were not important to operators in low
density areas, there was a great deal of interest among the high
density feeder carriers. STOL capability is absolutely essential
to at least one operator, since one of the major points he serves
only has a very short STOL runway. Two operators found it econom-
ically essential to have STOL aircraft. These operators both fly
into Kennedy using its short runway. They have developed proce-
dures with the air traffic controllers permitting them to operate
on a non-interference basis with the regular traffic pattern. They
do not get into the duty runway queue, thus avoiding both traffic
delays and higher landing fees. The savings made possible by STOL
are the difference between their financial success and failure. Sev-
eral other operators felt that STOL was not essential but operation-
ally convenient for many of the same reasons.
Three carriers expressed an interest in VTOL aircraft. Two,
as high density feeders, saw VTOL as a way of serving downtown areas,
particularly to the outlying airport. The other carrier operated into
areas where the terrain was mountainous and would find VTOL capa-
bility a great asset.
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5.1.6 Power Plant Requirements
Almost all carriers thought two engines were preferable
to four. Although four provide better engine-out performance,
this was outweighed by maintenance considerations.
The commuter carriers had little preference as to the type
of power plant. Prop, propjet, propfan or pure jet were all
acceptable. The choice was based not on which one 
had more
appeal but which one had the lowest operating cost, including
depreciation on investment. Since cost is the criteria, 
the
turboprop is the best engine for commuter aircraft both in 
terms
of initial cost and low altitude, shorthaul operating costs. 
A
high bypass variable pitch fan might satisfy their 
needs in the
more distant future.
The dominant interest in cost was tempered somewhat by envi-
ronmental considerations. Noise and chemical pollution are not
issues for the commuters at most points they serve. There are
isolated problem areas, however, and the operators see the 
poten-
tial problems that might arise in the future. The turboprop was
therefore more acceptable for environmental reasons also.
In contrast, 7 out of 8 local carriers thought any new air-
craft had to be jet powered.
5.1.7 Jet Appeal
When questioned in depth on why local carriers felt a new
aircraft had to be jet, they tended to rely on "motherhood" state-
ments like "The passenger expects jet comfort, and trunk-type
service", or "People won't fly props anymore". These 
statements
are in direct conflict with the commuters' experience that 
reli-
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ability and frequency were more important than equipment type.
Yet every carrier had an example, usually on his own airline,
where the introduction of jet service increased traffic.
Several of these examples were pursued in detail and in
every case there were a number of other factors surrounding
the introduction of the jet that could have produced the same
result. For example, the new jet service was always accom-
panied by an advertising and promotional campaign. No one
knew of a similar attempt to advertise the preexisting prop
service. In another case, the jet was used to provide one stop
service in place of a five stop turboprop flight. In another,
the introduction of the jet was accompanied by new through and
joint fare agreements that essentially let the passenger fly
for free. (It should be noted that these fare agreements had
been rejected by the connecting carriers on the basis of dis-
parate service before the jet was introduced.) Finally, one
community used the introduction of a jet as a tool for changing
people's attitudes about flying from the local airport instead
of driving to an alternate facility. (See 5.2)
The only clear connection between jet service and
traffic generation was traced to travel agents. Jet service
gives the agent an additional selling point when arranging for
travel from a small city. At least one agent did not feel peo-
ple would respond to pressure to ride existing turboprops, but
he could talk them into trying the jet instead of driving.
Whether or not his feelings were correct, he actively sold jet
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service. If other travel agents feel the same, the carrier would
definitely see an increase in traffic when the jet is introduced
but because of additional selling by the travel agents, not merely
because a jet aircraft is being used.
5.1.8 Other Aircraft Characteristics
All agree that any new aircraft should be pressurized and
air conditioned. The local service carriers take this for granted
since most of their aircraft have had these features for several
years. Since few commuter aircraft have pressurization or air
conditioning, it is more important to these carriers. There were
many stories of passenger discomfort on bumpy low altitude flights,
particularly on hot days, and very high altitude flights under
any conditions.
Because of the short haul nature of both the local service
and commuter industries, all carriers were concerned about hy-
draulic systems and lower maintenance breaks and flaps. One
local service carrier estimated the break and flap maintenance
on the F 27 at $3 to $4 per operation.
5.1.9 Cost Trade-Offs
In general, commuter carriers are initial cost conscious
because of limited capital resources and limited,high cost credit.
These factors are more important than aircraft performance or
efficiency, although the latter two are not ignored. Most felt
an aircraft priced at $750,000 was pushing their resources, and
anything over $1 million was prohibitive.
In contrast, the local service carriers are more concerned
about operating costs than purchase price, although some admitted
139
they would have difficulty financing a major re-equipment
program at this time. Most felt that 2.5 million would be
about right for a 50-60 passenger aircraft.
In actuality, the important factor is not how much the
aircraft cost or what it costs to operate, but whether its pro-
ductivity will offset those costs. The commuters and locals
both intuitively solve this question, evaluate their cash flow
problems and integrate the results to decide how much they will
pay for an aircraft.
5.1.10 Unionization
This is not a major issue for local service carriers since
they have been unionized for some time, Table 5.6 lists their
union affiliations. Most commuters, however, are afraid of
unionization. They see the rates and rules of the local ser-
vice industry and realize they could not survive under such a
cost structure. Those who have been unionized, however, have
discovered that many of their fears are unfounded. The unions
have realized the tenuous financial. positions of many commuters
and their demands have been within that framework.
TABLE 5.6
Local Service Union Affiliations*
Flight Flight
Airline Pilots Attendants Dispatchers Mechanics
Allegheny ALPA ALPA NONE IAM
Frontier ALPA ALPA TWU IAM
Hughes Airwest ALPA ALPA TWU AMFA
North Central ALPA ALPA TWU IAM
Ozark ALPA ALPA ALDA AMFA
Piedmont ALPA ALPA TWU IAM
Southern ALPA ALSSA NONE NONE
Texas International ALPA ALPA TWU IAM
ALPA - Air Line Pilots Assn. AMFA - Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Ass
ALDA - Air Line Dispatchers Assn. IAM - International Assn. of Mechanice
ALSSA - Air Line Stewards & TWU - Transport Workers Union
Stewardesses Assn. *Source: Aviation Daily
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5.1.11 Anticipated Impact of Part 298 Liberalization
The Civil Aeronautics Boards' Economic Regulations -Part
298 was changed in 1972 to allow commuters to operate up to 30
passenger aircraft without detailed economic regulation by the
Board. However, this has not changed the aircraft plans of most
commuters. First, there are few aircraft available in the 20-30
seat range. Second, most carriers cannot afford the capital out-
lay to buy larger aircraft. Finally, they are unsure of the costs
of operating a larger aircraft because of additional maintenance
and the addition of a stewardess required by the FAA. Since the
time of the survey, however, a few carriers have gained some ex-
perience with this size aircraft and the results are promising.
Indications are that the increased capacity more than offsets
the additional costs.
TABLE 5.7
Subsidy Issues
1 Local carrier is actively
seeking elimination of all
subsidy-eligible points in
the near future.
4 Locals would like to be off
subsidy in 5 to 10 years,
but will require it until
low traffic points can be
phased out.
3 Locals see their role as serving
low density cities, and plan to
continue such service as long
as subsidy is provided.
5.1.12 Discussion of Table 5.7
The carriers' thoughts on subsidy closely reflect their
growth plans as reflected in Table 5.2. Carriers in one group
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seek to change their identity and become trunk carriers. They
need subsidy during the transformation, but in the long run will
eliminate points that are unprofitable without it. Subsidy is
considered more of a nuisance than it is worth and the subsi-
dized markets are not envisioned as improving greatly in the
future.
Carriers in the second group still see their mission as
providing local service, although they do want more long-haul,
non-subsidized routes. These carriers have been subsidized from
the start and need the subsidy to provide service to small com-
munities. They do not object to receiving subsidy for this ser-
vice, but could not provide it without government support.
5.1.13 The Bid System
Since the interviews, this proposal has been allowed to
lapse by the CAB, and is therefore not discussed in detail. In
general, the reaction was unfavorable, largely because the plan
was not fully understood. Major objections were that a 3 year
contract was too short to finance the aircraft needed to provide
the service and that inexperienced operators would bid in low,
cut cost by compromising safety and then give the industry a
bad name by providing poor and unsafe service. The latter is
the classic argument used against the air mail bid system of the
1920s and 30s.
5.1.14 Summary of Carrier Survey
Both the local service and commuter industries are quite
diverse in the characteristics of the carriers, thei: plans and
their needs. No one aircraft can possibly meet all their
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requirements. Rather, at least three types of needed aircraft
were identified, but not many of any one type. The first is
a new generation of high speed, pressurized turboprops of 19 or
less seats. The new Metro seems to fill this gap. The second
aircraft would have about 30 seats. The practicality of this
plane may depend on the experience of commuter carriers now using
aircraft carrying 20 to 26 passengers. Potential aircraft are
all foreign - a revamped Nord 262 or the stretched Shorts Skyvan.
Jet aircraft are not competitive in this size because the markets
served are primarily short haul, low altitude segments where the
turboprop can outperform. the jet. Finally, there is a need for
a 40 to 60 passenger, high-bypass ratio jet for some of the local
service carriers. This market, however, would probably not ex-
ceed 150 to 200 aircraft without foreign sales, or a military
or business market.
5.2 Community Survey - Pueblo, Colorado
The most remarkable story used to exemplify "jet appeal" was
heard at Frontier. The City of Pueblo agreed to underwrite Frontier's
operation of a jet from their city to the extent of $4,000 a month
for up to 6 months. To see why the community thought jet service
was so important, a day was spent with civic and community leaders,
and their responses recorded.
Pueblo, Colorado is an industrial and farming city of just un-
der 100,000 people, located 106 miles south of Denver and 38 miles
south of Colorado Springs. At one time, the city was served by
four certificated carriers. In fact, the El Paso-Pueblo route was
the first awarded to Varney, the predecessor of Continental Air-
lines. However, as the trunks acquired larger aircraft and free-
ways were completed north to Colorado Springs and Denver, the stop
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was deleted by all carriers but Frontier. As late as 1965,
Pueblo received non-stop or one-stop DC-3 (and limited Con-
vair 580) service to 10 cities, with one non-stop and 5 one-
stop flights to Denver per day by Continental and Frontier.
By 1967, Continental had left the market. Frontier still
provided non or one-stop service to 7 cities with 4 non-stops
and 2 one-stops to Denver. In 1970, only 5 cities were con-
nected to Pueblo by non or one-stop flights. Service to Den-
ver had dropped to one non-stop and 4 one-stops by Frontier.
Three non-stop flights to Denver were offered by Trans Central,
a commuter with twin Cessnas, for several months, but were even-
tually stopped.
According to local interests, the quality of the service
deproved even more than its frequency. Flights were cancelled
or late. Since most Denver flights stopped at Colorado Springs,
they never gained enough altitude to avoid a local area of tur-
bulence created by the mountains. The number of passengers
using the airport dropped off from 40,000 in 1968 to 30,000 in 1970.
Then, two unrelated events took place. First, Frontier
went through a change of ownership and management. The new of-
ficers began to stress service and service reliability. Second,
Walter Berry, a retired local businessman, became the head of
the Transportation Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, and
eventually the Pueblo Airport Director of Aviation.
For years, the Chamber of Commerce had struggled with the
broad problems of transpotation to the city. Mr. Berry decided
to attack one problem at a time and, as a pilot and former fixed
base operator, felt air service should be the first topic.
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Mr. Berry's approach was to treat the problem as a business
venture and to open a dialogue with the new Frontier management.
A 100% sample of all tickets written by Frontier or local travel
agents was taken to determine the destinations of the Pueblo air
traveller. A professor at the local college was hired to conduct
a market survey to see why people did not fly. Unreliable ser-
vice was the major reason, but many people thought Frontier was
still flying the long retired DC-3 or that the price was too high.
As a result, Mr. Berry was convinced that the community could
potentially generate many more passengers. The problem was get-
ting them out of their cars and onto the airplane.
During this period, Mr. Berry received the active support
of the city manager, Mr. Fred Weisbrod, and the president of the
Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Cal Snyder. They all realized that
there was nothing really wrong with Frontier's service, particu-
larly under the new management. But people in the town had got-
ten into the habit of "bad-mouthing" the service and the airline.
It is not clear who generated the idea, but jet service was adopted
as the rallying point to change public opinion.
When first approached, Frontier's immediate reaction was
that the traffic could not support jet service, and that no air-
craft were available anyway. Mr. Berry and Mr. Ray Seybold, a
local travel agent who was Frontier's Station Manager at the
time, went through Frontier's entire fleet assignments until
they located a jet laying over at Denver at night with its first
departure at around 9 A.M. This aircraft was available for an
early morning flight from Denver to Pueblo and back.
Once more Mr. Berry approached Frontier. Realizing that
Pueblo's interest was serious, Frontier's Bill Wayne, Vice-Pres-
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ident of Local Service Marketing, instigated a study of the pro-
posed operation. After a detailed profit and loss analysis,
Frontier concluded the service would lose $48,000 per year. How-
ever, Frontier was still interested in introducing jet service
and proposed a risk-sharing plan to the city. After a short per-
iod of negotiation, Pueblo agreed to underwrite Frontier's losses
up to $4000 per month for a 6 month trial period. The funds were
to be taken from airport funds and not from the city's tax reven-
ues which eased passage of the plan through the city council.
Frontier also filed for a number of joint and through fares which
came into effect 6 months after the experiment was begun.
A joint advertising and public relations campaign was insti-
tuted by Frontier and the Chamber of Commerce, based on a "use it
or lose it" philosophy. This was an effective foil for community
critics who had complained about the quality of air service. Now
they had what they wanted for at least 6 months, and if the exper-
iment failed, it would be because the community had not supported
it.
The publicity generated additional passengers even before
the jet was introduced, but freight response lagged. However,
in the fourth month of jet service freight movements increased
dramatically. This was followed by another surge in passenger
growth during the sixth month as the joint fares were introduced.
(See Table 5.8) At the end of the sixth month, Frontier notified
the city that no further subsidy would be needed.
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TABLE 5.8
Passenger Enplanement Comparison
Pueblo Municipal Airport
Source: Mr. Lyle Sharp; Pueblo Director of Aviation
1970
Pas'grs %'Change Pas'grs % Change Pas'grs % Change
Boarded From 1968 Boarded From 1970 Boarded From 1971
January 1,284 -7 1,330 +3 1,631 +23
February 1,072 -11 1,126 +5 1,642 ) +46
March 1,253 -22 1,368 +9 2,017 +47
April 1,109 -34 1,524 +37 2,153 +41
May 1,194 -22 1,433 +20 2,123 +48
June 1,255 -36 1,595 +27 2,344 +47
July 1,511 -16 1,631 +8 2,364 +45
August 1,466 -22 1,856 +27 2,622 +41
September 1,324 -14 1,509 (1) +14 2,174 +45
October 1,354 -21 1,637 +21 2,045 +25
November 1,174 -14 1,418 +21 2,125 +50
December 1,385 -23 1,756 +27 2,484 +41
1. Jet introduced.
2. Fares Reduced.
Not only had passengers responded to the jet, but also to
air service in general. More people flew the Convairs than ever
before. People had become air conscious once more. By the end
of 1972, the first full year of jet operation, passenger boardings
had increased by 80% over 1970, the last totally non-jet year.
Freight increased by a factor of 3 over the same time period.
Several people were asked for their reactions now that the gam-
ble had been successful. Mrs. Pat Kelly, City Councilwoman commented
that it was a matter of education. Once people flew and saw the
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benefits, they flew more often, even on the Convairs. Good
air service and particularly jet service creates an image of a
prosperous, successful community and so the experiement was suc-
cessful.
Mr. Weisbrod, the city manager,felt that role of government
is giving people what they wanted. If nothing else, the experi-
ment quieted critics. He also felt that it should not be con-
sidered unusual for a city to subsidize air service. They sub-
sidize public transportation, golf, tennis and the like. The
city looks for job creation and will invest in proportion to the
number of jobs that can be generated. Each job is equal to a
$10,000 saving in welfare payments and so any project that gen-
erates 5 or more jobs is eligible for city support. By this
criteria, he felt the investment in new jet service has more than
paid for itself, although he admitted it was difficult to trace
the total number of jobs created.
Mr. Weisbrod said the city acted on the belief that jet ser-
vice and a good airport are important to a community. There was
no study to back this up. It was purely belief. But it fit with
their overall community development. There was an activist city
government after years of a "hands off" policy. All the streets
in the city were paved for the first time. It was a period of
excitement, and the idea of jet service fit in.
In summary, it was not that people preferred to ride jets. The
jet was made a symbol of civic pride and used as a tool to increase
the use of the airport, encourage industry and create jobs in the
community. Mr. Berry stated that to this day, many people flying
who once drove don't know whether they are on a jet or not. But
they do know that Pueblo is a city with jet service.
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5.3 Manufacturer Survey
Interviews were conducted with Beech, Cessna, Fairchild
and Grumman. Consequently, Boeing, Douglas and Lockheed were
visited. Beech and Cessna are primarily manufacturers of light
aircraft and Fairchild and Grumman are primarily manufacturers
of military and medium sized civil aircraft. Boeing, Douglas
and Lockheed are known for their production of larger military
and civil aircraft. The general question of the market for com-
mercial aircraft in the 19 to 60 passenger size was explored.
5.3.1 Market Characteristics
The manufacturers felt that some demand for new aircraft
in this size range exists. The market breaks down into three
categories. The first is the 19 passenger size. This is the
largest size that can be flown without a stewardess and is ap-
proximately the maximum size that can be designed under the
12,500 lb. gross weight breakpoint for certification and main-
tenance. The second category is the 30 passenger size, which
is the largest that can be flown by commuters without special
exemption. The third category is the 30 to 60 passenger range
which does not have definite break points within it, other than
the addition of a second stewardess at a 50 passenger capacity.
There is little room for new aircraft in the first cate-
gory since the Beech 99, DHC Twin Otter and Swearingen Metro
have this market well covered now and into the foreseeable fu-
ture.
There is some disagreement in regard to the second category,
the 30 passenger size. The question is whether the regional car-
iers would buy aircraft in this category. If they do not, the re-
maining market of commuter, corporate, and foreign customers is
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too fragmented to allow a single aircraft to sell in sufficient
quantity. Manufacturer surveys indicated that four of the eight
regionals could conceivably replace their existing turboprops
with a 30 passenger turbofan. If so, the market would be large
enough for serious consideration. (Survey results, however, indicated
that these carriers are not psychologically attuned to this small
an aircraft.) In regard to powerplant, the turbofan is favored,
but not unanimously, at this size.
In regard to the third category, the 40 to 60 passenger
size range, the replacement of the regionals existing turboprops
with turbofan aircraft represents a good, stable market. How-
ever, this size was outside the current range of interest for
Beech and Cessna and would be a stretch for Grumman. Fairchild
is already involved in the marketing of foreign aircraft in this
size range and would probably not compete with itself. Two of
the larger manufacturers felt there was a market for an aircraft
of this size, and that it be profitable to produce provided only
one manufacturer entered that market. However, they concluded
that there were better investments for their limited corporate
funds. Furthermore, a new aircraft would face stiff competition
from used turbofan equipment from the trunks, particularly the
DC-9-10, selling below the price of a new, 40 to 60 passenger
plane.
5.3.2 Design Characteristics
Any new aircraft should be as simple as possible in order
to meet cost and time constraints. Pressurization and retract-
able gear are required, but STOL capability is not desired or
necessary in the low/medium density market. The Q-Fan is very
interesting but too complicated and heavy for this type of ap-
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plication. Aerodynamics and structures should be strictly
state of the art, stressing simplicity and durability.
5.3.3 Costs
A development cost of $90 million and a production cost of
$1.8 million per aircraft was representative of all four smaller
companies for a 30 passenger turbofan. This gives the price vs
production run relationship shown in Figure 5.1. The light air-
craft manufacturers would have lower production costs than
larger companies for low production runs. Crossing the 12,500 lb.
weight limit or going to a turbofan triples the certification
costs and drives development costs up 30%. Two of the large man-
ufacturers indicated similar costs per aircraft, but with lower
development and higher production costs. The third manufacturer
estimated the cost to be twice these figures, but admitted that
this figure was probably high.
5.3.4 Government Technical Assistance
The manufacturers felt that research leading to further
reductions in the cost of turbofan engines is needed. The new
Lycoming ALF 502 is a step in the right direction but the goal
should be to reduce the purchase cost per pound of static thrust
to that of the turboprops. Other important areas are new low
speed airfoils, reducing the cost of fatigue life certification,
and better anti-icing equipment.
5.3.5 Government Regulatory and Financial Assistance
Any plan which would reduce the manufacturer's risk in dev-
eloping a new aircraft would be helpful. This could take many
forms such as guaranteed loans, risk sharing with the manufactur-
er, or by increasing the economic health of the customers
through conventional subsidies or a bid system. However, any
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such system must remain in effect long enough for both the man-
ufacturers and the airlines to make realistic long range plans.
Some manufacturers are very reluctant to get into any market
which is dependent on government regulation because the regu-
lations are subject to change. There is also great concern a-
bout the general instability of the commuter airlines, and the
resulting wide fluctuations in aircraft orders. In summary,
the greatest contribution the government could make would be
to increase the general health and stability of the low/medium
air transportation industry.
5.3.6 International Markets
Several manufacturers had looked at the potential for a
30 to 60 passenger aircraft for use by developing countries.
They are concerned that the new nation will select a non-U.S.
aircraft to serve its remote towns and cities because no U.S.
plane exists in this size range. Then, when these markets
grow and could support a U.S. produced aircraft, the country
will already be committed to the other nation and continue to
buy from them.
However, the aircraft needed by developing countries and
that needed by the U.S. local service carriers are not the
same. The new nation needs cargo capacity, not passengers.
Since many of these nations are in Africa, South America and
South East Asia, the aircraft must have high temperature, high
altitude performance. It must be able to operate out of unim-
proved fields.
It was suggested that the government should underwrite the
cost of this type aircraft for foreign relations purposes as we
does with some military sales. It would be an investment in
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future, unsubsidized aircraft sales which help the balance of
payments. If the local service carriers found the aircraft
useful also, so much the better, but it should not be designed
with such common use in mind.
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6. Computer Network Analysis
6.1 Introduction
Issues of importance to low density short haul air trans-
portation were investigated in a number of scenarios using a
regional airline fleet assignment model. Four regional carriers
were examined to see 1) the suitability of a 40 seat modern jet
to the existing operations, 2) the usefulness of a light turboprop
aircraft of less than 20 seats in providing low density service
and 3) the financial advantages of providing subsidized service
using commuter air carriers rather than regional carriers.
The profit oriented decision making process of an airline
management was modeled using Fleet Assignment model #4 (FA-4),
a software package created at the FTL. FA-4 attempts to choose
aircraft and serve routings for an airline in such a way as to
attract the greatest clienteleat the least cost. The basic
attributes of the model are:
1) the objective function is the excess of revenues over
costs.
2) the airline route network can be served by a selection
from a broad choice of non-stop, one-stop, and two-stop aircraft
flights called routings.
3) any aircraft in the airline's fleet may fly any routing
in the system.
4) the number of passengers carried in any city pair market
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depends upon the existence of seating capacity on non-stop,
one-stop, or two-stop flights and also upon the daily frequency
of these flights.
5) a minimum level of service for any city pair market
(in terms of flights per day) or any city (in terms of departures
per day) may be. specified.
For costs, the program uses direct operating costs (DOCs)
for the aircraft, and marginal indirect operating costs (IOCs)
for passenger handling. Revenues are ticket income at a fixed
yield.
6.2 Conceptual Discussion of the fetwork Model FA-4
Fleet Assignment model 4 is stated in a linear programming
formulation. A series of constraints are defined, and an objective
function is optimized subject to these constraints. The constraints
are:
1) The passengers (and hence the revenues) in any given
city pair market cannot exceed a certain value. This value
rises as the level of service (daily frequency) in a market rises.
2) The level of service in any city pair market is the sum
of all the direct and multistop flights which connect the two
cities. The value of a multistop flight or a flight by a slow
aircraft in contributing to this level of service is less than
that of a nonstop jet flight.
3) A minimum number of departures a day from certain cities
may be specified. It does n- matter by which aircraft the
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minimum departures are flown, or to which destination.
4) on any flight between two cities the load factor due to
both origin-destination passengers and passengers criginating
before the beginning of the hop or having destinations beyond
the end of the hop is not permitted to exceed a maximum stated
on board load factor.
The objective function merely states that the sum of all
the revenues derived from passengers attracted to the service
less their indirect handling costs, and minus the sum of all the
block hour costs from all the aircraft-routing combinations
chosen to be flown must be maximized. This maximizes total
contribution to overhead or total profits.
6.3 The Value of Multistop and Prop Flights in determining the
level of service.
In any given market the level of service in equivalent
frequency depends on both the number of stops and the aircraft
type. Thus a non-stop jet flight is 1.0, a one-stop jet is 0.9,
a two-stop jet 0.8, a non-stop turboprop 0.95, a non-stop light plane
0.85, and so on. Thus a one-stop jet flight twice a day plus one
turboprop non-stop flight would produce an equivalent frequency
of 2x0.9+0.95=2.75 flights per average day.
The 1.0, 0.95, 0.85 weighting factors for jet, prop, and
light plane attractiveness were standard. The weightings for
number of stops depended somewhat on the length of the route,
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with longer routes penalizing an intermediate stop less.
6.4 Data Sources for FA-4 Studies
The cost and demand data used in the FA-4 studies of re-
gional carriers came, as much as possible, from published CAB
figures for the year 1971. Demand data was derived from the
on line Origin-Destination data (table 10). Existing levels of
service were determined from the Official Airline Guide (OAG) for
the period. Aircraft block hour costs came from Aircraft Operating
Cost and Performance Report. For the new jet design (called the
US-40) and for the DHC-6 (Twin Otter) the ATA formula was used
to establish the ratio of block hour costs to those of aircraft
actually in service. The depreciation was left out of the block
hour costs. A capital cost designed to approximate the dry lease
cost of the aircraft replaced depreciation.
In each case each airline was permitted to have in its
fleet the aircraft it already had, plus a forty seat jet, the
US-40, much like the Falcon 30T in design. The Twin Otter was
also available, as a representative commuter light plane design.
Routing options included both existing flight patterns and
currently unused routings permissible within the existing route
awards.
Minimum levels of service to each community were set at
4 departures per day or at the existing levels, whichever were
lower. Large hubs had no minimum levels of service.
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6.5 Details of Regional Airlines Studied
Four regional airlines were studied. First Ozark was ex-
amined as being most typical - having average stage length
and average trip length near the industry means (see table 6.1).
Ozark also has both low density isolated and low density non-
isolated markets. The Ozark study was the pilot study and as
such explored more blind alleys than the later studies. The
later studies benefited from several refinements in technique
which did not apply t3 the Ozark case.
Later studies were made of Southern, because of the high
proportion of low density non-isolated markets, and of Fron-
tier and Hughes Air West, because of the proponderance of
isolated subsidized markets.
The Ozark case study is explained in detail, much
of which echoes in specific terms the general description above.
The studies of Southern, Frontier, and Air West will be summarized
in table form, since the methodology is identical.
6.6 Ozark Case Study
The study attempted to predict the effect of introducing a 40
seat jet aircraft into the route network of a regional carrier.
The exercise is the same as would be carried out by an airline
in determining the suitability of an aircraft for purchase. In
effect the airline assumes it has its present fleet plus an
unlimited supply of new aircraft, and asks which aircraft can
best be used.
Table 6.1 COMPARISON OF REGIONAL AIR CARRIERS IN 1970
Trip* Stage Stations Aircraft Scheduled Passenger Subsidy Profits
Length Length Served Total Boardings Revenues
(mi) (mi) - - (000) ($000) ($000) ($000)
Allegheny
and Mohawk 275 182 70 102 8,200 197,000 3,700 5,300
Frontier 392 166 85 47 2,400 75,000 1,500 400
Southern 238 143 54 38 1,600 37,000 4,600 -1,500
Hughes/
Air West 281 172 72 45 2,400 54,000 7,100 -4,700
North
Central 204 121 69 49 3,700 77,000 4,900 6,900
Piedmont 284 130 51 43 2,700 63,000 3,400 1,700 o
Texas
Int'l 263 160 54 41 2,200 52,000 4,900 -3,500
Ozark 253 150 50 38 2,400 56,000 3,800 1,500
TOTAL 257 156 403 24,800 612,000 33,900 6,300
*1969 Data, the last year reported.
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The new aircraft can enter the system either by direct
replacement of existing aircraft on existing routings, or by
replacement of sets of routings with new patterns serving the
same passenger markets. These decisions are made for the whole
route network by the linear programming fleet assignment model
FA-4.
6.6.1 Discussion of Inputs for Ozark Case Study
A. Indirect Operating Costs (IOC's)
Certain indirect operating costs were included in the
total operating costs for the case study. This was done, as
normally would be done at an airline, so that an increase
in the size of operations will not be recommended unless all
the actual costs of such expansion are accounted for. Thus
the long run marginal indirect operating costs were included:
Marginal IOC per passenger mile = $0.0025
Marginal IOC per aircraft mile = $0.02
Marginal IOC per passenger boarded = $2.00
Marginal IOC per aircraft departure = $12.00
These numbers are estimates in keeping with generally
accepted costs for regional carriers, and agree with Ozark's
1971 reported costs.
B. Direct Operating Costs
The direct operating costs for each aircraft were expressed
in dollars per block hour. Ozark uses DC-9-30,DC-9-10, and FH-227's.
Block hour costs without depreciation were available for Ozark
from the CAB's Aircraft Operating Cost and Performance Report,
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Vol. V. Ozark also operates DeHavilland Twin Otters (the DHC-6),
but no cost figures are yet available. For both the DHC-6 and the
US-40, the hypothetical modern 40 seat jet aircraft being tested,
DOC was developed by the ATA 67 formula. Table 6.2 compares the total
aircraft avaliable. The ATA DOC's for all four aircraft were used
to establish their relative DOC's and the ratio of ATA to reported
DOC's for Ozarks DC-9-30's and F-227's established the ratio of ATA
to Ozark's costs for the US-40 and the DHC-6.
Included in DOC in place of depreciation is capital costs.
This cost category includes both depreciation and interest on
the capital invested in the aircraft. The cost of capital was
assumed to be 8%. 85% of the aircraft price was treated like a
10 or 12 year 8% mortgage with constant annual payments. The
other 15% of the price, the residual value at the end of the
depreciation period, was financed at a flat 8% a year. This procedure
was adopted to ensure a proper inclusion of the capital costs
of investing in a new aircraft.
Block times for the DC-9 and FH-227 were derived from the
Official Airline Guide (OAG). For the US-40 and DHC-6 block times
were estimated.
C. Airport Landing Fees
Landing fee for all airports were assumed to be $0.18/thou-
sand lbs. gross take off weight. The exceptions were LaGuardia,
O'Hare, and Dulles, where the values were $1.20, $0.25, and
$0.20 respectively.
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Table 6.2
AIRCRAFT COSTS FOR OZARK AIRLINES
DC-9-30 FH-227 DC-9-10 US-40 DHC-6
Seats (Ozark) 97.0 45.7 74.0 40.0 19.0
Gross Wt.
(lbs. x 103) 109. 45. 91. 43. 12.5
Ozark DOC* 325 220 403 N.A. N.A.$/hr. @ Stage length @219 @103 @221
ATA DOC* 358 185 349 257 127
@ Stage Length @200 @100 @200 @150 @100
Case Study
DOC* 390 193 390 267 136
Purchase Price $3.5 $0.8 $1.8 $2.5 $0.65
(106) (used) (used) (used) (used) (used)
Depreciation Period
(years to 15%) 12 10 12 12 10
Utilization
(hrs./year) 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500
Capital Costs
($/hr.) $169 $37.8 $87 $121 $31
DOC with Capital
Costs $559 $231 $477 $388 $167
Effective Cruise
Speed** 418 mph 220 mph 418 mph 400 mph 165 mph
Zero Distance
Block Time** 14 min 7 min 14 min 7 min 5 min
Intrinsic Appeal
Factor 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
*Without Depreciation and rentals
**From OAG data; US-40 Assumed
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D. Minimum Levels of Service
In a reasonable approximation of the minimum levels of
service enforced by the CAB, at least 4 departures per day
were required at all points on Ozark's system, except where
less service currently existed. The destination city was
not specified, so the routing decision was left in the hands
of the optimization procedure.
E. Revenues and Yield
Ozark received a yield of 80.6% of coach fare including
tax in 1970 operations. The revenues per passenger were
expressed as 80.6% of jet coach fares. Where jet coach
fares were lacking, prop fares, which usually are $1 or $2
higher, were used.
F. Demand
The basic demand function for a city pair relates the
travellers attracted to the level of service as in Figure 6.1.
One point on the graph was available from the combination of
on line origin-destination (O-D) data for Ozark for the 12
months preceding April 1971 and the OAG for the period. The
shape of the curve was determined from the formula:
Pax = KT
Where K is a constant whose value is established by the
known data point.
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( is the time elasticity of the market, assumed to be
- 1.3 from analyses of short haul markets in the Northeast
Corridor.
T is total trip time, and includes an hour of access and
egress, a half hour of boarding and take off plus a cruise
time dependent on distance. In addition T includes wait time,
defined as 8 hrs - daily frequency. Wait time is an index
of the schedule convenience. It was used in the calibration
for oC
If competitive services exist, the traffic is split
between Ozark and the competition so that Ozark receives a
market share equal to its frequency share.
If service is with one or more stops, the equivalent
frequency value is reduced by the ratio of total travel time
non-stop to total travel time multistop. A stop adds hr.
to the tr-ip.
If service is offered with a faster (or slower) aircraft,
the equivalent frequency value is the ratio of total trip
times, with the cruise time portions adjusted for the aircraft
speeds.
All city pair markets in excess of 5 outbound passengers
a day were included. In addition, occasional smaller city
pair markets were included if they were incidentally served
by some routings. Four stops, Lake of the Ozarks, Mo.;
Sterling-Rock Falls, Ill.; Kirksville, Mo.; and Rockford,
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Wisc. were deleted from the network because they boarded a
total of less than 5 passengers per day in all markets.
G. Routings
The basic list of permissible aircraft routings was
supplied from the list of Ozark's flights in the June 1972
OAG. Routings having more than four stations had to be
broken up into several overlapping four station routings for
the current computer coding. This coding prevents service
with three or more intermediate stops from being offered.
However there was no non-zero city pair demand served only
by three stop flights, so no passengers were neglected.
In addition to this basic list of routing options, about
50 non-stop and multistop routings were created where judgment
and preliminary results suggested such flights might be useful.
Figure 6.2 is the Ozark route awarded by the CAB.
H. Sizes of Input Parameters
In all, there were 49 stations, 140 non-zero city pair
demands,and 160 routings to choose from.
6.6.2 Results
Run #1: Reproduce Ozark's Current System
The initial exercise of FA-4 was an attempt to approximate
the actual operations of Ozark Airlines. Because of variations
in schedules through the year, only an approximation of
Ozark's total revenues and passengers was obtained. The
yield figure assumed appeared to be a little bit high. Table 6.3
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Table 6.3
OZARK AIRLINES FA-4 RUNS - ANNUAL FIGURES
SYSTEM
CONTRIBU-' LOAD
RUN REVENUES PAX TION FACTOR DC-9-30 FH-227 DC-9-10 OTHER STATIONS
Actual Data
Reported $57.9M 2.55M xx 43.8%/ 12.0 21.0 7.0 NA 49
1. Ozarks Routings
Forced 59.0 2.51 $ 9.45 39.1 12.0 21.0 4.6 NA 49
2. Optimal Case 84.3 3.51 26.01 51.5 5.1 49.0 4.2 NA 
49
3. Twin Otter Run 81.9 3.40 25.42 54.7 6.2 21.0 7.0 22.6 49
4. US-40 Run 89.8 3.69 27.68 54.5 5.7 16.9 3.7 21.3 49
5. No min. service 82.0 3.38 27.20 53.0 5.2 44.8 4.0 NA 37
6. Commuter Alone 4.8 0.28 0.86 50.5 NA NA NA 10.8 (+4)*
7. Min. Service by
Commuter 5.1 0.29 0.25 43.4 NA NA NA 13.5 (+12)*
* Added to 37 Stations served willingly by the regional carrier
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contains the revenue, passengers, contribution to overhead,
and aircraft use for each case study.
Run #2: Optimal Routings of Ozark's current Aircraft
FA-4 optimizes both the routing and aircraft assign-
ments. In so doing a great growth in passengers and load
factor was possible on Ozark's system by substituting more
FH-227 flights for existing DC-9 flights. The implication
is that many of Ozark's markets are "under-frequencied" or
served with too large an aircraft.
Run #3: Optimal Routings with Twin Otter Added to the Fleet
The addition of the Twin Otter was made without permitting
the FH-227 to grow in numbers. Since the contribution to over-
head is higher with unlimited FH-227's, one might conclude
that the Twin Otter is not an overwhelmingly attractive
addition to Ozark's fleet. Specialized use in minimum
service markets is indicated.
Run #4: Optimal Routings with 40 Seat Jet (US-40) Added to
Regular Fleet
A 40 seat jet can successfully replace the FH-227 on
just over half the flights. The FH-227 is preferred for the
shorter hops. Since in the optimal case the FH-227 had
already replaced considerable DC-9 activity, the US-40 is in
effect replacing DC-9's as well as FH-227's in an attempt to
correct the low load factors and low frequencies in Ozark's
markets.
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Run #5: No Minimum Levels of Service Specified
In order to estimate the marginal operating costs
(exclusive of the costs of keeping a station open in each
town) of providing services that create a loss, an FA-4 run
was made relaxing the minimum service constraints.
A total of 12 stations are dropped with a savings of
$1.2 million per year. A very small reduction in the need
for smaller aircraft occurs.
Run #6: Commuter Assumption of Markets Abandoned by Ozark
The markets abandoned by Ozark in the no minimum service
case study were offered to an airline with commuter operating
costs. The changes in costs were:
Ozark Commuter
DHC-6 DOC per block hour = $167 $125
IOC per revenue pax-mile = $0.0025 0.0
IOC per aircraft mile = $0.02 0.0
IOC per aircraft departure = $12.00 $3.0
IOC per passenger boarding = $2.00 $1.0
Four of the abandoned cities were served by the commuter
air carriers, as well as several other cities and markets.
Only 11 Twin Otters were needed.
Run #7: Minimum Service Constraints Filled by Commuters
A second case was run using the markets abandoned by
Ozark in order to reduce operating losses by $1.2 million.
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This time the neglected services must be provided by the
commuter. For half the cost, the same frequencies of
service were provided by commuter airlines. Only 0.4% of
Ozark's existing annual traffic is involved in this extension
of commuters operations.
6.6.3 Other Case Studies
In addition to this set of seven runs, a number of
other special runs were performed on Ozark's system:
Special Study #1: The Effect of Jet Appeal Factors in
Aircraft Use Decisions
The use of a diminished prop appeal factor so that, all
other things being equal, one propeller flight counted only
80% or 90% as much as one jet flight in attracting traffic,
virtually eliminated the use of the FH-227 in favor of the
US-40. The FH-227 was used only to serve markets of such
very low density that the passengers carried were unimportant.
This strong response to jet appeal factors led to the use of
an estimate of jet appeal factors.in all subsequent analysis
of regional air carriers.
Considerable overall market stimulation occurs by
replacing the FH-227 with a jet. Table 6.4 contains the details
of the special studies.
Special Study #2: The Effect of DOC on the Use of the US-40
A 10% decrease in DOC (including capital costs) allowed
Table 6.4
SPECIAL STUDIES FOR OZARK SYSTEM
STUDY REVENUES PAX CONTRIBUTION DC-9-30 FH-227 DC-9-10 US-40
1. Jet Effect
prop = 0.8 $100.0M 4.17M $32.3M 7.7 1.1 3.9 31.8
prop = 0.9 93.5 3.87 $29.6M 7.2 4.6 3.9 28.0
2. Effect of US-40 DOC
down 10% 93.1 3.84 30.4 6.5 1.2 3.8 33.2
up on short ranges 86.0 3.55 26.2 5.3 48.0 2.9 3.6
3. Demand Sensitivity
Demand up 20/ $117.9 4.81 40.7 9.1 23.7 7.7 19.1
4. Diminished Frecuency
Effect 76.3 3.17 24.5 5.3 21.0 3.0 13.2
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the US-40 to replace the FH-227 in almost all cases and also
permitted some futher encroachment into DC-9 markets. In a
second run an increase in DOC was designed to reflect the
costs that would be expected for an aircraft designed and
operated as for 1000 mile ranges rather than the short haul
limitation of 500 miles. With this higher DOC, all US-40
use is replaced by the FH-227.
The US-40 and the FH-227 have similar trip costs and
seat costs, and one can replace the other with very little
change in overall costs. Additional runs revealed that the
total demand for all 40 seat aircraft does not change
dramatically with change in DOC. A ± 10% variation pro-
duces a ±17% variation in aircraft needs.
Special Study #3: Demand Sensitivity
A growth in demand of 25% in all markets did not materially
affect the need for small aircraft. Medium sized markets
grow big enough to be served by DC-9's, but small narkets
grow to medium size and need more small plane service. The
net result is no change in the need for small aircraft.
It must be borne in mind that very small markets and
markets not currently served were not included in this
analysis. Growth in these areas could increase the need for
40 seat aircraft.
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Special Study #4: Diminished Frequency Effect
By increasing assembled block time and decreasing the
length of the travelling day in the demand equation,
the importance of frequency in establishing the size of a
market can be considerably diminished. However, the results
were surprisingly insensitive to such a variation. In general
somewhat less market stimulation is possible by increased
levels of service, but some efforts still bear fruit. The
demand for small short haul aircraft does not materially diminish.
6.7 Southern Airways Case Study
Southern was chosen for a case study because of the high
preponderance of hub and spoke,low density non-isolated
markets currently served on their system. Figure 6.3 is the
Southern route map.
For the Southern case study two changes were made. A
new set of IOC values were employed in an attempt to.be more
accurate. And in addition the sensitivity to jet appeal
factors was noted, and corrections made to the equivalent
frequency weights of jet and prop flights. Table 6.5 is a list
of the changes. Table 6.6 is the aircraft operating costs.
The OAG of the month of October was used to reflect the
year of 1971 average operating conditions. City pair demands
down to 1 origins a day were considered.
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SOUTHERN AIRWAYS, INC. FIGURE 6.3
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Table 6.5
SOUTHERN COSTS
IOC per passenger boarding = $2.75
IOC per passenger mile = $0.006
IOC per aircraft departure = $20.00
IOC per aircraft mile = $0.30
Equivalent Frequency weight of a jet = 1.0
Equivalent Frequency weight of a large prop aircraft = 0.95
Equivalent Frequency weight of the Twin Otter = 0.85
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Table 6.6
SOUTHERN AIRWAYS AIRCRAFT OPERATING COSTS
DC-9-10 US-40 M404 DHC-6
Seats (Southern) 75 40 40 19
Gross Wt.
(x103 lbs.) 90.7 43.3 43.7 12.5
Southern's DOC* $368 $196
N.A. N.A.($/hr.) @ Stage @184 mi. N.A. @102 mi.
ATA DOC* $369 $265 $127
N.A.@ mi. Stage @100 mi. @100 mi. @100 mi.
Case Study
DOC* $369 $265 $196 $127
Purchase Price
(x106 ) $2.0 (used) $2.5 (new) $0.075 (used)$0.75 (new)
Depreciation Period
(years to 15%) 15 15 10 10
Utilization
(hrs./year) 2700 hrs. 2700 hrs. 2000 hrs. 2000 hrs.
Capital Costs
($/hr) $91.5 $115.9 $6. $60.
DOC with Capital Costs $460 $381 $202 $187
Effective Cruise Speed** 450 mph. 430 mph. 184 mph. 171 mph.
Zero Distance
Block Time ** .234 hrs. .117 hrs. .117 hrs. .117 hrs.
*Without Depreciation and Rentals
**From Regression Analysis of QAG data; US-40 Assumed
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6.7.1 Results
The first thing of note with Southern is that even with
more conservative marginal cost estimates than used for the
Ozark case study, the FA-4 optimal solution urges a large
expansion of the system by added frequencies and routes.
The growth is absorbed by an increase in the DC-9 fleet,
with no growth in the need for the 40 seat Martin 404's.
See Table 6.7.
Secondly, a 40 seat jet can almost totally replace
the Martin 404 in Southern's network.
Somewhat surprisingly the Twin Otter shows considerable
savings when used to serve the subsidized markets.
If Southern were permitted to abandon subsidized service,
the need for 40 seat aircraft would all but melt away.
Twenty stations would be dropped from the system. Savings
would total $4.4 million above fixed station costs.
In the normal course of events, commuter air carriers
could be expected to offer service to five of these abandoned
points. If subsidized by $1.2 million, commuters could serve
all 20 points.
6.8 Hughes Air West Case Study
Hughes Air West was studied for the 12 months preceding
Sept., 1971 -- this is the only available 12 month period of
merged operations without a strike. Because of the difficulties
of the strikes and mergers, imperfect information was used.
Table 6.7
SOUTHERN AIRLINES FA-4 RUN, ANNUAL FIGURES
CASE REVENUES PASSENGERS CONTRIBUTION LOAD FACTOR DC-9 M404 OTHER STATIONS
Reported Data $45.22M 1.875M x x 43.2% 15 17 na 53
1. Southern 43.51 1.800 $ -4.603M 40.2% 17.7 21.1 na 53
routings on
FA-4
2. Optimal Case 73.47 2.747 9.416 51.2% 24.5 19.0 na 52
3. Twin Otter 73.32 2.734 10.178 52.5% 25.5 7.4 11.4 52
Run
4. US-40 Run 81.75 3.094 11.400 52.7% 22.7 3.3 15.7 52
C
5. No Minimum 69.58 2.550 13.816 54.0% 24.2 6.7 na 43
Service
6. Commuter Alone 2.53 0.127 0.307 67.4% na na 7.5 (+5)
7. Commuter 3.62 0.190 -0.914 45.0% na na 15.5 (+20)
Satisfying
Service
Constraints
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For instance, 1970 aircraft operating costs were used, and
a December OAG was used for scheduling. Still the general
results should be accurate in a planning sense. Table 6.8 is
the aircraft cost information for Hughes. Other costs were
as in the Southern case. Figure 6.4 is the current route map.
6.8.1 Results
Table 6.9 presents the results. Once again by using more
non-stop routings with smaller aircraft.much market stimula-
tion appears to be possible. The higher load factor
achieved permits still further growth. Again the growth does
not create a larger demand for the small capacity aircraft.
In Hughes Air West's case, with many isolated markets in
the long range end of the spectrum of short haul, a large
demand for a 40 seat jet develops. Many new markets are
entered, and a surge in revenues and profits occurs. This
represents a real increase in service. On the other hand a
replacement of the F-27 with the Twin Otter, which saves
considerable expense, does not allow expansion to carry more
passengers.
Almost half of Hughes Air West's cities are served at
a loss, which totals $9.3 million. Only 4 of the 33 cities
might be served by commuters using Twin Otters, but the cost
of serving the remaining 24 points by commuters is only $4.6 million.
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Table 6.8
HUGHES AIR WEST AIRCRAFT OPERATING COSTS
DC-9-30 F-27-500 US-40 DHC-6
Seats (Air West) 96 40 40 19
Gross Wt. 3 109 45 43.3 12.5
(lbs. x 10 )
Air West DOC* $365 $221 N.A. N.A.
$/hr. @Stage Length @243 @112
ATA DOC* $358 $186 $265 $127
@ Stage Length @200 @100 @100 @100
Case Study $358 $188 $265 $127
DOC*
Purchase Price
(x 106) $5.2(new) $1.6(used) $2.5(new) $0.75(new)
Depreciation Period 15 10 15 10
(years to 15%)
Utilization 2500 2000 2000 2000
(per year)
Capital Costs $260 $129 $156 $60.3
($/hr.)
DOC with Capital Costs $618/hr. $315/hr. $421/hr. $187/hr.
Effective Cruise Speed** 461 mph 225 mph 440 mph 171 mph
Zero Distance Block Time** .273 hr. .129 hr. .129 hr. .117 hr.
Intrinsic Appeal Factor 1.0 .95 1.0 .85
* Without depreciation and rentals. 1970 data is presented because
in 1971 Air West suffered a strike.
** From regression analysis of OAG data; US-40 assumed.
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Table 6.9
HUGHES AIR WEST FA-4 RUNS, ANNUAL FIGURES
CASE REVENUES PASSENGERS CONTRIBUTION LOAD DC-9 F-27 OTHER STATIONS
Reported Data $79.46M 3.11M x x 46.1% 19.4 25.0 na 67
1. Air West 77.20 3.03 $1.035M 44.0 21.8 21.6 na 67
routings on
FA-4
2. Optimal 121.20 4.58 14.971 50.6 30.0 28.1 na 67
Case
3. Twin Otter 124.59 4.76 20.036 52.8 30.6 3.9 35.2 67
Run
4. US-40 Run 164.12 6.29 25.166 55.6 25.8 0.0 45.8 67
5. No Minimum 111.53 4.13 24.236 53.6 29.5 10.6 na 34
Service
6. Commuter Alone 2.024 0.123 0.190 58.3 na na 4 (+4)
7. Commuter 7.533 0.395 -4.801 36.2 na na 30.5 (+33)
Satisfying
Minimum Service
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Table 6.10
FRONTIER AIR LINES AIRCRAFT OPERATING COSTS
B727-200 B737-200 CV-580 US-40 DHC-6
Seats (Frontier) 135 97 50 40 15
Gross Wt.
(lbs. x 103) 184 155.5 54.6 43.3 12.5
Frontier DOC* $418 $398 $275 $93
$/hr. @ Stage Length @331 @525 @120 @93
ATA DOC* $342 $184 $265 $127
@Stage Length N.A. @300 @100 @100 @100
Case Study
DOC* $418 $398 $275 $300 $93
Purc ase Price $3.6 $3.0 $0.25 $2.5 $0.75
(x10 ) (used) (used) (used) (new) (new)
Depreciation Period
(years to 15%) 15 15 10 15 10
Utilization
(hrs. per year) 2500 2500 2000 2000 2000
Capital Costs
($/hr.) $180 $150 $20 $156 $60
DOC with Capital Costs $598 $548 $295 $456 $153
Effective Cruise
Speed** 507 mph 450 mph 300 mph 430 mph 171 mph
Zero Distance
Block Time** .333 hrs .275 hrs. .206 hrs. .206 hrs. .117 hrE
Intrinsic Appeal
Factor 1.0 1.0 .95 1.0 .85
*Without Depreciation and Rentals
**From Regression Analysis of OAG data; US-40 Assumed
Front
Route.
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6.9 Frontier Case Study
The model of the Frontier system suffered slightly in
rigor because the system of 94 stations needed to be
divided into a northern and southern section in order to fit
on the existing software for FA-4. Fortunately by judicious
choice of the dividing line and careful consideration of the
half dozen demands for flights across the line, a reasonable
approximation was achieved.
Frontier was modeled for the year 1971 using the April
OAG. Aircraft costs are presented in Table 6.10. Figure 6.5 is
the route map. All other costs were as for Hughes Air West
and Southern.
Frontier in 1971 used both the Beech 99 and the Twin
Otter with 15 seats. Costs, therefore, were available for
both. A composite aircraft, the TPl5 was used in the run.
6.9.1 Results
A particularly surprising result occurred when the
optimal case was compared to actual operations. A combination
of 727 and Convair 580 services was used to replace existing
737 services. Sometimes the ratios of 727 to CV-580
frequencies seemed schedulable and sometimes the decision
making process of the fleet assignment model needed correction
in the face of limitations enforced by scheduling constraints.
In general the 737 is probably a better choice than the 727
for many routes, even though the 727 was used.
Table 6.11
FRONTIER FA-4 RUNS, ANNUAL FIGURES
CASE REVENUES PASSENGERS CONTRIBUTION LOAD B727 B737 CV580 OTHER STATIONS
Reported Data $79.575M 2.738M x x 45.8% 3 12 32 4 94
1. Frontier 77.148 2.683 $4.245 37. 3.0 12.0 37.8 4.5 94
Routings on
FA -4
2. Optimal Case 106.726 3.449 15.405 49. 12.2 0.0 47.4 na 94
3. Light Twin 104.768 3.374 22.170 54. 13.2 0.0 13.8 29.3 93
Case
4.US-40 Case 109.221 3.510 16.532 50. 12.7 0.0 42.3 4.5 94
5. No Minimum 104.024 2.818 29.092 55. 12.3 0.0 13.8 na 29
Service
6. Commuter Alone 5.325 0.271 0.647 55. na na na 12.1 (+13)
7. Commuter 10.940 0.623 -4.554 34. na na na 53.9 (+65)
Satisfying
Service
Constraints
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The optimal case once again showed some traffic stimula-
tion by increased service provided by the smaller CV-580
aircraft. In direct contradiction of the results exhibited
by Hughes Air West for similar routes, the US-40 design was
unable to replace the older Convairs even with a small
advantage from jet appeal. The light twin, as usual, was
able to achieve vast savings ($6.7 million) in serving the
many low density routes on Frontier's system.
A total of $13.6 million in operating expenses could
be saved by eliminating 65 of the 94 stations in Frontier's
system. Thirteen of these points could be picked up by
commuters without incentive, and another $5.2 million could
persuade commuters to serve all 65 points.
6.10 Case Studies of Commuter Airlines
In addition to the extensive studies of regional airlines,
three case studies of commuter airlines were made using FA-4
and whatever imperfect data on costs and traffic could be
assembled. Golden West, Air Wisconsin, and Mackey International
were studied as representative of three successful large
commuters.
Preliminary results suggested that it would not be to
the commuters' advantage to cross the 12,500 lb. line and
graduate to regional airline costs in their markets. Even
under vastly reduced DOC's, larger aircraft were not attractive
to the commuters.
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The single exception was Mackey International, which
operates in markets where frequency of service is less
important. Here existing Convair 440 flights could be
replaced by a modern jet service at some small savings.
The commuter case studies were not pursued in any
detail, since preliminary results left so little possibility
that a small jet could be useful.
6.11 Conclusions
The case studies did not come out with any overwhelmingly
positive corrections to existing conditions.
A new modern jet of modest capacity could be used to some
small advantage to replace existing older propeller driven
designs in low density markets. This is true even if the
immense capital costs of a new plane are considered in the
e-penses. However this conclusion is sensitive to the eco-
nomics of the aircraft design. A higher operating cost would
make the new jet not competitive.
If the local service carriers were to abandon the subsidized
markets, the need for small aircraft would drop to a third.
The existing fare levels do not permit a small aircraft to ope-
rate without a loss at reasonable load factors. Indeed even at
costs typical of the commuter airlines, existing fares will not
support service to most of the subsidized cities. Commuter
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airlines can, of course, cut the operating losses by over
one half.
Indeed the other major lesson to be learned from the
case studies is that a small light twin such as the Twin
Otter can often serve very low density markets as efficiently
as a new jet design. The difficulty for the jet lies in
the cost of flying empty seats in a small market.
The general conclusions are: 1) a small jet is useful only
as a replacement for existing small turboprop aircraft and only
if the economics are reasonable; 2) the use of such an aircraft
is to cut losses rather than increase profits; and 3) the use of
a light twin aircraft can approach the savings offered by a
modern jet and, in the hands of the commuter airlines, halve
the losses incurred providing service to low density cities.
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The main objective of this study was to determine if
there is a potential market for a small, United States
manufactured aircraft in the 20 to 50 passenger range similar
to the YAK - 40, Falcon 30, VFW 614, to serve the low/medium
density markets of the United States. A subsidiary issue that
was addressed was how the introduction of such a aircraft would
affect subsidy in these markets.
The study consisted basically of two phases. One phase
was essentially a market research project to determine the needs
of carriers in the medium/low density area- the local service
airlines and the commuter air carriers. Discussions were also held
with United States aircraft manufactures to obtain their opinions as
to the market potential of an aircraft in the 20 to 50 passenger
size. Other organizations active in various aspects of the air
transportation industry were also surveyed.
Another phase of the study centered upon a computer network
analysis of four local service airlines as well as some commuter
air carriers. These analysis were undertaken to see the effect of
introduction of a new aircraft into the fleets of these regional
carriers, as well as to obtain a clearer picture of the number of
smaller aircraft that these carriers could profitably operate.
Additionally, some other analytic techniques were developed that are
useful in studying problems in the low/medium density air trans-
)o
193
portation area.
The results of the field surveys of the carriers can be sum-
marized as follows:
(a) The commuter air carriers see no need for a small 30
passenger jet for the immediate future (priced at about $2 million).
The commuters feel that the existing turboprops (the Beech 99,
Twin Otter and Swearingen Metro) are sufficient to meet their
market needs. At their stage lengths (less than 100 miles,
generally) the greater speed of the jet is not sufficient to
offset the higher cost of the aircraft, as differences in block
times would be minimal. Future aircraft for the commuter industry
will be additions to the existing fleets, rather than replace-
ments of current generation aircraft. For some commuters with
peaking problems, a larger aircraft would be useful, but a turboprop
will be sufficient if pressurized and air conditioned.
(b) The local service airlines definetely want a jet aircraft
to replace their aging turboprops. The size of the aircraft is
partially contingent upon whether the carriers intend to serve
low density, subsidized points in the future. Those that do in
general are more favorably inclined toward a smaller aircraft, but
smaller in their terms is about 60 passengers. Planes in the 30
passenger range are rejected because of segment flow problems,
as well as inability to use the aircraft over the complete regional
network.
194
United States manufacturers tend to fall into two categories.
The big three of the industry recognize that a market for a small
jet (40 - 60 passenger size) exists, but are convinced that their
corporate resources are better used for larger aircraft ddvelopment.
The smaller manufacturers feel that a 30 passenger jet could have
some appeal for commuters, but do not see a large enough market to
justify a development program. On the ot-jer hand, aircraft that are
bigger (40 to60 passengers) are felt to be out of reach because of
the high development costs, as well as the manufacturers' lack of
experience in producing larger aircraft.
The results of the computer model network analysis can be
summarized as follows:
(a) Three out of the four local service carriers analyzed
could replace their current turboprop equipment with a 40
passenger jet anj increase their profits.
(b) All local service carriers could increase their profits
substantially by using small turboprop aircraft (such as the Twin
Otter and Swearingen Metro)to serve their low density points. The
40 passenger jet would not substantially decrease their subsidy
needs.
(c) Commuters generally are flying equipment that is well
suited to their markets. A 30 passenger jet -does not profitably
fit into most of their networks.
The following conclusions are drawn as a result of the study:
(a) In the United States alone there is a large enough market
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( about 200) to make a new U.S. designed 40 to 60 passenger jet
aircraft a reasonable financial venture; additionally there is
considerable world - wide market potential for such an aircraf'.
The purchase of such an aircraft by United States regional carriers
could improve their profitablilty, particularly with a 40 seat
version. The risk to the manufacturer of this aircraft would be
in having more than one supplier attempting to meet the demand for
this aircraft. An aircraft of this size is not well suited for the
low density, subsidized points and, except for increasing profitability
of the carriers, will not reduce their subsidy needs.
(b) For commuter and low density markets, the need for a new
20 - 30 passenger high speed jet aircraft is not as clearly
eatablished at this time. Continued growth of the commuter industry
and longer route segments may eventually require this type of aircraft.
For the commuter industry, governmental regulatory changes could
be considerably more significant than new aircraft acquisition.
Some changes that would have substantial impact would be:
(1) Restructuring of the low density markets by allowing
commuter replacements of local service carriers.
(2) Extension of operating subsidies to commuters in these
markets.
(3) Expansion of the quaranteed loan program to include commuters.
(4) Change in FAA regulations (FAR 135) to bring maintenance
and crew requirements in line with the CAB's 30 passenger, 7,5001b.
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Part 298 restrictions.
Aircraft that serve low/medium density areas, whether of the
larger (40 -50) or smaller (30) versions, should be designed with
low cost as a major design criterion, together with maximum reliability.
There has to date been no U.S. design that has emphasized economy,
and a design competition for such a vehicle would be highly beneficial
to the U.S. air transportation industry.
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